diff options
author | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> | 2018-04-12 00:15:22 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> | 2018-05-22 13:16:42 -0400 |
commit | 6f0911a666d1f99ff72e7848ddee36af7bbce050 (patch) | |
tree | 5cf7324ad0d10828704a87762b86ca5f845371c3 /security/integrity/ima | |
parent | fd90bc559bfba743ae8de87ff23b92a5e4668062 (diff) |
ima: fix updating the ima_appraise flag
As IMA policy rules are added, a mask of the type of rule (eg. kernel
modules, firmware, IMA policy) is updated. Unlike custom IMA policy
rules, which replace the original builtin policy rules and update the
mask, the builtin "secure_boot" policy rules were loaded, but did not
update the mask.
This patch refactors the code to load custom policies, defining a new
function named ima_appraise_flag(). The new function is called either
when loading the builtin "secure_boot" or custom policies.
Fixes: 503ceaef8e2e ("ima: define a set of appraisal rules requiring file signatures")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/ima')
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 28 |
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 03cbba423e59..8bbc18eb07eb 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -440,6 +440,17 @@ void ima_update_policy_flag(void) ima_policy_flag &= ~IMA_APPRAISE; } +static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func) +{ + if (func == MODULE_CHECK) + return IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES; + else if (func == FIRMWARE_CHECK) + return IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE; + else if (func == POLICY_CHECK) + return IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY; + return 0; +} + /** * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules. * @@ -478,9 +489,11 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) * Insert the appraise rules requiring file signatures, prior to * any other appraise rules. */ - for (i = 0; i < secure_boot_entries; i++) - list_add_tail(&secure_boot_rules[i].list, - &ima_default_rules); + for (i = 0; i < secure_boot_entries; i++) { + list_add_tail(&secure_boot_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules); + temp_ima_appraise |= + ima_appraise_flag(secure_boot_rules[i].func); + } for (i = 0; i < appraise_entries; i++) { list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[i].list, @@ -934,12 +947,9 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) } if (!result && (entry->action == UNKNOWN)) result = -EINVAL; - else if (entry->func == MODULE_CHECK) - temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES; - else if (entry->func == FIRMWARE_CHECK) - temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE; - else if (entry->func == POLICY_CHECK) - temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY; + else if (entry->action == APPRAISE) + temp_ima_appraise |= ima_appraise_flag(entry->func); + audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result); audit_log_end(ab); return result; |