diff options
| author | Brian Gix <brian.gix@intel.com> | 2021-11-24 12:16:28 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> | 2021-11-24 17:29:12 +0100 |
| commit | 899663be5e75dc0174dc8bda0b5e6826edf0b29a (patch) | |
| tree | 36438f3acd4d31a48494192a2ed28849cdbbf131 /net/bluetooth | |
| parent | 21a241b3bc153b346987a28cc132674646589e02 (diff) | |
Bluetooth: refactor malicious adv data check
Check for out-of-bound read was being performed at the end of while
num_reports loop, and would fill journal with false positives. Added
check to beginning of loop processing so that it doesn't get checked
after ptr has been advanced.
Signed-off-by: Brian Gix <brian.gix@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/bluetooth')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 10 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c index efc5458b1345..dee4ef22fc88 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c @@ -5920,6 +5920,11 @@ static void hci_le_adv_report_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) struct hci_ev_le_advertising_info *ev = ptr; s8 rssi; + if (ptr > (void *)skb_tail_pointer(skb) - sizeof(*ev)) { + bt_dev_err(hdev, "Malicious advertising data."); + break; + } + if (ev->length <= HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH && ev->data + ev->length <= skb_tail_pointer(skb)) { rssi = ev->data[ev->length]; @@ -5931,11 +5936,6 @@ static void hci_le_adv_report_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) } ptr += sizeof(*ev) + ev->length + 1; - - if (ptr > (void *) skb_tail_pointer(skb) - sizeof(*ev)) { - bt_dev_err(hdev, "Malicious advertising data. Stopping processing"); - break; - } } hci_dev_unlock(hdev); |