diff options
| author | Florian Zumbiehl <florz@florz.de> | 2007-04-20 16:58:14 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | David S. Miller <davem@sunset.davemloft.net> | 2007-04-25 22:29:20 -0700 |
| commit | 202a03acf9994076055df40ae093a5c5474ad0bd (patch) | |
| tree | 293b06b3c8789cf9df053d6ab1da70dcdecd1f75 /drivers/net | |
| parent | 74b885cf86def9bc836772e3c1788c00b72a35c9 (diff) | |
[PPPOE]: memory leak when socket is release()d before PPPIOCGCHAN has been called on it
below you find a patch that fixes a memory leak when a PPPoE socket is
release()d after it has been connect()ed, but before the PPPIOCGCHAN ioctl
ever has been called on it.
This is somewhat of a security problem, too, since PPPoE sockets can be
created by any user, so any user can easily allocate all the machine's
RAM to non-swappable address space and thus DoS the system.
Is there any specific reason for PPPoE sockets being available to any
unprivileged process, BTW? After all, you need a packet socket for the
discovery stage anyway, so it's unlikely that any unprivileged process
will ever need to create a PPPoE socket, no? Allocating all session IDs
for a known AC is a kind of DoS, too, after all - with Juniper ERXes,
this is really easy, actually, since they don't ever assign session ids
above 8000 ...
Signed-off-by: Florian Zumbiehl <florz@florz.de>
Acked-by: Michal Ostrowski <mostrows@earthlink.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/net')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/net/pppox.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/net/pppox.c b/drivers/net/pppox.c index 9315046b3f55..3f8115db4d54 100644 --- a/drivers/net/pppox.c +++ b/drivers/net/pppox.c @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ void pppox_unbind_sock(struct sock *sk) { /* Clear connection to ppp device, if attached. */ - if (sk->sk_state & (PPPOX_BOUND | PPPOX_ZOMBIE)) { + if (sk->sk_state & (PPPOX_BOUND | PPPOX_CONNECTED | PPPOX_ZOMBIE)) { ppp_unregister_channel(&pppox_sk(sk)->chan); sk->sk_state = PPPOX_DEAD; } |