summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/fs/crypto
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>2019-12-09 12:39:18 -0800
committerEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>2019-12-31 10:33:50 -0600
commitc64cfb989f008eed2622e822e90f2fcabd49d605 (patch)
tree8bdfb8de50bf7355ae7f14f392909055e5efc20d /fs/crypto
parent6e1adb88d230b08ad9a223ecaea1e6b238a9078f (diff)
fscrypt: verify that the crypto_skcipher has the correct ivsize
As a sanity check, verify that the allocated crypto_skcipher actually has the ivsize that fscrypt is assuming it has. This will always be the case unless there's a bug. But if there ever is such a bug (e.g. like there was in earlier versions of the ESSIV conversion patch [1]) it's preferable for it to be immediately obvious, and not rely on the ciphertext verification tests failing due to uninitialized IV bytes. [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/linux-crypto/20190702215517.GA69157@gmail.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191209203918.225691-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/crypto')
-rw-r--r--fs/crypto/keysetup.c4
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
index c9f4fe955971..39fdea79e912 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
@@ -91,6 +91,10 @@ struct crypto_skcipher *fscrypt_allocate_skcipher(struct fscrypt_mode *mode,
pr_info("fscrypt: %s using implementation \"%s\"\n",
mode->friendly_name, crypto_skcipher_driver_name(tfm));
}
+ if (WARN_ON(crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm) != mode->ivsize)) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto err_free_tfm;
+ }
crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS);
err = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, raw_key, mode->keysize);
if (err)