From 96d4f267e40f9509e8a66e2b39e8b95655617693 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linus Torvalds Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 18:57:57 -0800 Subject: Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand. It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact. A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's just get this done once and for all. This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form. There were a couple of notable cases: - csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias. - the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing really used it) - microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch. I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'virt') diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c index 666d0155662d..1f888a103f78 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c @@ -939,8 +939,7 @@ int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, /* We can read the guest memory with __xxx_user() later on. */ if ((id < KVM_USER_MEM_SLOTS) && ((mem->userspace_addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) || - !access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, - (void __user *)(unsigned long)mem->userspace_addr, + !access_ok((void __user *)(unsigned long)mem->userspace_addr, mem->memory_size))) goto out; if (as_id >= KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM || id >= KVM_MEM_SLOTS_NUM) -- cgit v1.2.3