From 3bf4b5b11d381fed6a94a7e487e01c8b3bc436b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Borkmann Date: Sat, 7 Sep 2013 09:41:34 +0200 Subject: net: ovs: flow: fix potential illegal memory access in __parse_flow_nlattrs In function __parse_flow_nlattrs(), we check for condition (type > OVS_KEY_ATTR_MAX) and if true, print an error, but we do not return from this function as in other checks. It seems this has been forgotten, as otherwise, we could access beyond the memory of ovs_key_lens, which is of ovs_key_lens[OVS_KEY_ATTR_MAX + 1]. Hence, a maliciously prepared nla_type from user space could access beyond this upper limit. Introduced by 03f0d916a ("openvswitch: Mega flow implementation"). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Cc: Andy Zhou Acked-by: Jesse Gross Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/openvswitch/flow.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/openvswitch/flow.c b/net/openvswitch/flow.c index fb36f8565161..410db90db73d 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/flow.c +++ b/net/openvswitch/flow.c @@ -1178,6 +1178,7 @@ static int __parse_flow_nlattrs(const struct nlattr *attr, if (type > OVS_KEY_ATTR_MAX) { OVS_NLERR("Unknown key attribute (type=%d, max=%d).\n", type, OVS_KEY_ATTR_MAX); + return -EINVAL; } if (attrs & (1 << type)) { -- cgit v1.2.3