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2018-08-15Merge branch 'next-integrity' of ↵Linus Torvalds11-45/+102
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull integrity updates from James Morris: "This adds support for EVM signatures based on larger digests, contains a new audit record AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE to differentiate the IMA policy rules from the IMA-audit messages, addresses two deadlocks due to either loading or searching for crypto algorithms, and cleans up the audit messages" * 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: EVM: fix return value check in evm_write_xattrs() integrity: prevent deadlock during digsig verification. evm: Allow non-SHA1 digital signatures evm: Don't deadlock if a crypto algorithm is unavailable integrity: silence warning when CONFIG_SECURITYFS is not enabled ima: Differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions ima: Do not audit if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT is not set ima: Use audit_log_format() rather than audit_log_string() ima: Call audit_log_string() rather than logging it untrusted
2018-08-15Merge branch 'next-tpm' of ↵Linus Torvalds4-16/+10
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull TPM updates from James Morris: - Migrate away from PM runtime as explicit cmdReady/goIdle transactions for every command is a spec requirement. PM runtime adds only a layer of complexity on our case. - tpm_tis drivers can now specify the hwrng quality. - TPM 2.0 code uses now tpm_buf for constructing messages. Jarkko thinks Tomas Winkler has done the same for TPM 1.2, and will start digging those changes from the patchwork in the near future. - Bug fixes and clean ups * 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: ima: Get rid of ima_used_chip and use ima_tpm_chip != NULL instead ima: Use tpm_default_chip() and call TPM functions with a tpm_chip tpm: replace TPM_TRANSMIT_RAW with TPM_TRANSMIT_NESTED tpm: Convert tpm_find_get_ops() to use tpm_default_chip() tpm: Implement tpm_default_chip() to find a TPM chip tpm: rename tpm_chip_find_get() to tpm_find_get_ops() tpm: Allow tpm_tis drivers to set hwrng quality. tpm: Return the actual size when receiving an unsupported command tpm: separate cmd_ready/go_idle from runtime_pm tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon: switch to i2c_lock_bus(..., I2C_LOCK_SEGMENT) tpm_tis_spi: Pass the SPI IRQ down to the driver tpm: migrate tpm2_get_random() to use struct tpm_buf tpm: migrate tpm2_get_tpm_pt() to use struct tpm_buf tpm: migrate tpm2_probe() to use struct tpm_buf tpm: migrate tpm2_shutdown() to use struct tpm_buf
2018-08-15Merge branch 'next-general' of ↵Linus Torvalds4-17/+158
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: - kstrdup() return value fix from Eric Biggers - Add new security_load_data hook to differentiate security checking of kernel-loaded binaries in the case of there being no associated file descriptor, from Mimi Zohar. - Add ability to IMA to specify a policy at build-time, rather than just via command line params or by loading a custom policy, from Mimi. - Allow IMA and LSMs to prevent sysfs firmware load fallback (e.g. if using signed firmware), from Mimi. - Allow IMA to deny loading of kexec kernel images, as they cannot be measured by IMA, from Mimi. * 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: security: check for kstrdup() failure in lsm_append() security: export security_kernel_load_data function ima: based on policy warn about loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer) module: replace the existing LSM hook in init_module ima: add build time policy ima: based on policy require signed firmware (sysfs fallback) firmware: add call to LSM hook before firmware sysfs fallback ima: based on policy require signed kexec kernel images kexec: add call to LSM hook in original kexec_load syscall security: define new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data MAINTAINERS: remove the outdated "LINUX SECURITY MODULE (LSM) FRAMEWORK" entry
2018-07-28ima: Get rid of ima_used_chip and use ima_tpm_chip != NULL insteadStefan Berger4-8/+4
Get rid of ima_used_chip and use ima_tpm_chip variable instead for determining whether to use the TPM chip. Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
2018-07-28ima: Use tpm_default_chip() and call TPM functions with a tpm_chipStefan Berger4-9/+7
Rather than accessing the TPM functions by passing a NULL pointer for the tpm_chip, which causes a lookup for a suitable chip every time, get a hold of a tpm_chip and access the TPM functions using it. Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
2018-07-22EVM: fix return value check in evm_write_xattrs()Wei Yongjun1-2/+2
In case of error, the function audit_log_start() returns NULL pointer not ERR_PTR(). The IS_ERR() test in the return value check should be replaced with NULL test. Fixes: fa516b66a1bf ("EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs") Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2018-07-18integrity: prevent deadlock during digsig verification.Mikhail Kurinnoi1-0/+23
This patch aimed to prevent deadlock during digsig verification.The point of issue - user space utility modprobe and/or it's dependencies (ld-*.so, libz.so.*, libc-*.so and /lib/modules/ files) that could be used for kernel modules load during digsig verification and could be signed by digsig in the same time. First at all, look at crypto_alloc_tfm() work algorithm: crypto_alloc_tfm() will first attempt to locate an already loaded algorithm. If that fails and the kernel supports dynamically loadable modules, it will then attempt to load a module of the same name or alias. If that fails it will send a query to any loaded crypto manager to construct an algorithm on the fly. We have situation, when public_key_verify_signature() in case of RSA algorithm use alg_name to store internal information in order to construct an algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try to use alg_name in order to load kernel module with same name. 1) we can't do anything with crypto module work, since it designed to work exactly in this way; 2) we can't globally filter module requests for modprobe, since it designed to work with any requests. In this patch, I propose add an exception for "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" module requests only in case of enabled integrity asymmetric keys support. Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules for sure, we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup(). In this way we prevent modprobe execution during digsig verification and avoid possible deadlock if modprobe and/or it's dependencies also signed with digsig. Requested "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel module name formed by: 1) "pkcs1pad(rsa,%s)" in public_key_verify_signature(); 2) "crypto-%s" / "crypto-%s-all" in crypto_larval_lookup(). "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa," part of request is a constant and unique and could be used as filter. Signed-off-by: Mikhail Kurinnoi <viewizard@viewizard.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> include/linux/integrity.h | 13 +++++++++++++ security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ security/security.c | 7 ++++++- 3 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
2018-07-18evm: Allow non-SHA1 digital signaturesMatthew Garrett4-31/+46
SHA1 is reasonable in HMAC constructs, but it's desirable to be able to use stronger hashes in digital signatures. Modify the EVM crypto code so the hash type is imported from the digital signature and passed down to the hash calculation code, and return the digest size to higher layers for validation. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-07-18evm: Don't deadlock if a crypto algorithm is unavailableMatthew Garrett1-1/+2
When EVM attempts to appraise a file signed with a crypto algorithm the kernel doesn't have support for, it will cause the kernel to trigger a module load. If the EVM policy includes appraisal of kernel modules this will in turn call back into EVM - since EVM is holding a lock until the crypto initialisation is complete, this triggers a deadlock. Add a CRYPTO_NOLOAD flag and skip module loading if it's set, and add that flag in the EVM case in order to fail gracefully with an error message instead of deadlocking. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-07-18integrity: silence warning when CONFIG_SECURITYFS is not enabledSudeep Holla1-3/+6
When CONFIG_SECURITYFS is not enabled, securityfs_create_dir returns -ENODEV which throws the following error: "Unable to create integrity sysfs dir: -19" However, if the feature is disabled, it can't be warning and hence we need to silence the error. This patch checks for the error -ENODEV which is returned when CONFIG_SECURITYFS is disabled to stop the error being thrown. Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com> Acked-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-07-18ima: Differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actionsStefan Berger1-2/+2
The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and the IMA "audit" policy action. This patch defines AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE to reflect the IMA policy rules. Since we defined a new message type we can now also pass the audit_context and get an associated SYSCALL record. This now produces the following records when parsing IMA policy's rules: type=UNKNOWN[1807] msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): action=audit \ func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC res=1 type=UNKNOWN[1807] msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): action=audit \ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ res=1 type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): arch=c000003e syscall=1 \ success=yes exit=17 a0=1 a1=55bcfcca9030 a2=11 a3=7fcc1b55fb38 \ items=0 ppid=1567 pid=1601 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 \ fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=tty2 ses=2 comm="echo" \ exe="/usr/bin/echo" \ subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-07-18ima: Do not audit if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT is not setStefan Berger3-1/+21
If Integrity is not auditing, IMA shouldn't audit, either. Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-07-18ima: Use audit_log_format() rather than audit_log_string()Stefan Berger2-7/+2
Remove the usage of audit_log_string() and replace it with audit_log_format(). Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Suggested-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-07-18ima: Call audit_log_string() rather than logging it untrustedStefan Berger1-1/+1
The parameters passed to this logging function are all provided by a privileged user and therefore we can call audit_log_string() rather than audit_log_untrustedstring(). Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Suggested-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-07-16ima: based on policy warn about loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer)Mimi Zohar1-0/+8
Some systems are memory constrained but they need to load very large firmwares. The firmware subsystem allows drivers to request this firmware be loaded from the filesystem, but this requires that the entire firmware be loaded into kernel memory first before it's provided to the driver. This can lead to a situation where we map the firmware twice, once to load the firmware into kernel memory and once to copy the firmware into the final resting place. To resolve this problem, commit a098ecd2fa7d ("firmware: support loading into a pre-allocated buffer") introduced request_firmware_into_buf() API that allows drivers to request firmware be loaded directly into a pre-allocated buffer. Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the firmware being accessible to the device prior to the completion of IMA's signature verification any more than when using two buffers? (Refer to mailing list discussion[1]). Only on systems with an IOMMU can the access be prevented. As long as the signature verification completes prior to the DMA map is performed, the device can not access the buffer. This implies that the same buffer can not be re-used. Can we ensure the buffer has not been DMA mapped before using the pre-allocated buffer? [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/7/10/56 Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org> Cc: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-07-16module: replace the existing LSM hook in init_moduleMimi Zohar1-13/+10
Both the init_module and finit_module syscalls call either directly or indirectly the security_kernel_read_file LSM hook. This patch replaces the direct call in init_module with a call to the new security_kernel_load_data hook and makes the corresponding changes in SELinux, LoadPin, and IMA. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-07-16ima: add build time policyMimi Zohar2-3/+101
IMA by default does not measure, appraise or audit files, but can be enabled at runtime by specifying a builtin policy on the boot command line or by loading a custom policy. This patch defines a build time policy, which verifies kernel modules, firmware, kexec image, and/or the IMA policy signatures. This build time policy is automatically enabled at runtime and persists after loading a custom policy. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-07-16ima: based on policy require signed firmware (sysfs fallback)Mimi Zohar1-1/+9
With an IMA policy requiring signed firmware, this patch prevents the sysfs fallback method of loading firmware. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-07-16ima: based on policy require signed kexec kernel imagesMimi Zohar3-0/+30
The original kexec_load syscall can not verify file signatures, nor can the kexec image be measured. Based on policy, deny the kexec_load syscall. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-07-12IMA: don't propagate opened through the entire thingAl Viro3-12/+12
just check ->f_mode in ima_appraise_measurement() Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-06-07Merge branch 'next-integrity' of ↵Linus Torvalds13-83/+362
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull integrity updates from James Morris: "From Mimi: - add run time support for specifying additional security xattrs included in the security.evm HMAC/signature - some code clean up and bug fixes" * 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: EVM: unlock on error path in evm_read_xattrs() EVM: prevent array underflow in evm_write_xattrs() EVM: Fix null dereference on xattr when xattr fails to allocate EVM: fix memory leak of temporary buffer 'temp' IMA: use list_splice_tail_init_rcu() instead of its open coded variant ima: use match_string() helper ima: fix updating the ima_appraise flag ima: based on policy verify firmware signatures (pre-allocated buffer) ima: define a new policy condition based on the filesystem name EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs EVM: turn evm_config_xattrnames into a list integrity: Add an integrity directory in securityfs ima: Remove unused variable ima_initialized ima: Unify logging ima: Reflect correct permissions for policy
2018-06-06Merge tag 'audit-pr-20180605' of ↵Linus Torvalds2-2/+2
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit Pull audit updates from Paul Moore: "Another reasonable chunk of audit changes for v4.18, thirteen patches in total. The thirteen patches can mostly be broken down into one of four categories: general bug fixes, accessor functions for audit state stored in the task_struct, negative filter matches on executable names, and extending the (relatively) new seccomp logging knobs to the audit subsystem. The main driver for the accessor functions from Richard are the changes we're working on to associate audit events with containers, but I think they have some standalone value too so I figured it would be good to get them in now. The seccomp/audit patches from Tyler apply the seccomp logging improvements from a few releases ago to audit's seccomp logging; starting with this patchset the changes in /proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/actions_logged should apply to both the standard kernel logging and audit. As usual, everything passes the audit-testsuite and it happens to merge cleanly with your tree" [ Heh, except it had trivial merge conflicts with the SELinux tree that also came in from Paul - Linus ] * tag 'audit-pr-20180605' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit: audit: Fix wrong task in comparison of session ID audit: use existing session info function audit: normalize loginuid read access audit: use new audit_context access funciton for seccomp_actions_logged audit: use inline function to set audit context audit: use inline function to get audit context audit: convert sessionid unset to a macro seccomp: Don't special case audited processes when logging seccomp: Audit attempts to modify the actions_logged sysctl seccomp: Configurable separator for the actions_logged string seccomp: Separate read and write code for actions_logged sysctl audit: allow not equal op for audit by executable audit: add syscall information to FEATURE_CHANGE records
2018-06-01EVM: unlock on error path in evm_read_xattrs()Dan Carpenter1-1/+3
We need to unlock before returning on this error path. Fixes: fa516b66a1bf ("EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-05-31EVM: prevent array underflow in evm_write_xattrs()Dan Carpenter1-1/+1
If the user sets xattr->name[0] to NUL then we would read one character before the start of the array. This bug seems harmless as far as I can see but perhaps it would trigger a warning in KASAN. Fixes: fa516b66a1bf ("EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-05-31EVM: Fix null dereference on xattr when xattr fails to allocateColin Ian King1-2/+4
In the case where the allocation of xattr fails and xattr is NULL, the error exit return path via label 'out' will dereference xattr when kfree'ing xattr-name. Fix this by only kfree'ing xattr->name and xattr when xattr is non-null. Detected by CoverityScan, CID#1469366 ("Dereference after null check") Fixes: fa516b66a1bf ("EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs") Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-05-31EVM: fix memory leak of temporary buffer 'temp'Colin Ian King1-0/+2
The allocation of 'temp' is not kfree'd and hence there is a memory leak on each call of evm_read_xattrs. Fix this by kfree'ing it after copying data from it back to the user space buffer 'buf'. Detected by CoverityScan, CID#1469386 ("Resource Leak") Fixes: fa516b66a1bf ("EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs") Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-05-31IMA: use list_splice_tail_init_rcu() instead of its open coded variantPetko Manolov1-15/+2
Use list_splice_tail_init_rcu() to extend the existing custom IMA policy with additional IMA policy rules. Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petko.manolov@konsulko.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-05-31ima: use match_string() helperYisheng Xie1-7/+4
match_string() returns the index of an array for a matching string, which can be used intead of open coded variant. Signed-off-by: Yisheng Xie <xieyisheng1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-05-22ima: fix updating the ima_appraise flagMimi Zohar1-9/+19
As IMA policy rules are added, a mask of the type of rule (eg. kernel modules, firmware, IMA policy) is updated. Unlike custom IMA policy rules, which replace the original builtin policy rules and update the mask, the builtin "secure_boot" policy rules were loaded, but did not update the mask. This patch refactors the code to load custom policies, defining a new function named ima_appraise_flag(). The new function is called either when loading the builtin "secure_boot" or custom policies. Fixes: 503ceaef8e2e ("ima: define a set of appraisal rules requiring file signatures") Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-05-22ima: based on policy verify firmware signatures (pre-allocated buffer)Mimi Zohar1-0/+1
Don't differentiate, for now, between kernel_read_file_id READING_FIRMWARE and READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER enumerations. Fixes: a098ecd firmware: support loading into a pre-allocated buffer (since 4.8) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Stephen Boyd <stephen.boyd@linaro.org>
2018-05-22ima: define a new policy condition based on the filesystem nameMimi Zohar1-1/+24
If/when file data signatures are distributed with the file data, this patch will not be needed. In the current environment where only some files are signed, the ability to differentiate between file systems is needed. Some file systems consider the file system magic number internal to the file system. This patch defines a new IMA policy condition named "fsname", based on the superblock's file_system_type (sb->s_type) name. This allows policy rules to be expressed in terms of the filesystem name. The following sample rules require file signatures on rootfs files executed or mmap'ed. appraise func=BPRM_CHECK fsname=rootfs appraise_type=imasig appraise func=FILE_MMAP fsname=rootfs appraise_type=imasig Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2018-05-18EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrsMatthew Garrett4-4/+188
Sites may wish to provide additional metadata alongside files in order to make more fine-grained security decisions[1]. The security of this is enhanced if this metadata is protected, something that EVM makes possible. However, the kernel cannot know about the set of extended attributes that local admins may wish to protect, and hardcoding this policy in the kernel makes it difficult to change over time and less convenient for distributions to enable. This patch adds a new /sys/kernel/security/integrity/evm/evm_xattrs node, which can be read to obtain the current set of EVM-protected extended attributes or written to in order to add new entries. Extending this list will not change the validity of any existing signatures provided that the file in question does not have any of the additional extended attributes - missing xattrs are skipped when calculating the EVM hash. [1] For instance, a package manager could install information about the package uploader in an additional extended attribute. Local LSM policy could then be associated with that extended attribute in order to restrict the privileges available to packages from less trusted uploaders. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-05-18EVM: turn evm_config_xattrnames into a listMatthew Garrett3-39/+57
Use a list of xattrs rather than an array - this makes it easier to extend the list at runtime. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-05-17integrity: Add an integrity directory in securityfsMatthew Garrett4-4/+52
We want to add additional evm control nodes, and it'd be preferable not to clutter up the securityfs root directory any further. Create a new integrity directory, move the ima directory into it, create an evm directory for the evm attribute and add compatibility symlinks. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-05-17ima: Remove unused variable ima_initializedPetr Vorel2-6/+2
Commit a756024 ("ima: added ima_policy_flag variable") replaced ima_initialized with ima_policy_flag, but didn't remove ima_initialized. This patch removes it. Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-05-17ima: Unify loggingPetr Vorel3-2/+9
Define pr_fmt everywhere. Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz> Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> (powerpc build error) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Changelog: Previous pr_fmt definition was too late and caused problems in powerpc allyesconfg build.
2018-05-17ima: Reflect correct permissions for policyPetr Vorel1-0/+2
Kernel configured as CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY=y && CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY=n keeps 0600 mode after loading policy. Remove write permission to state that policy file no longer be written. Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-05-14audit: use inline function to get audit contextRichard Guy Briggs2-2/+2
Recognizing that the audit context is an internal audit value, use an access function to retrieve the audit context pointer for the task rather than reaching directly into the task struct to get it. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> [PM: merge fuzz in auditsc.c and selinuxfs.c, checkpatch.pl fixes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2018-05-03evm: Don't update hmacs in user ns mountsSeth Forshee1-1/+2
The kernel should not calculate new hmacs for mounts done by non-root users. Update evm_calc_hmac_or_hash() to refuse to calculate new hmacs for mounts for non-init user namespaces. Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-03-25ima: Fallback to the builtin hash algorithmPetr Vorel2-0/+15
IMA requires having it's hash algorithm be compiled-in due to it's early use. The default IMA algorithm is protected by Kconfig to be compiled-in. The ima_hash kernel parameter allows to choose the hash algorithm. When the specified algorithm is not available or available as a module, IMA initialization fails, which leads to a kernel panic (mknodat syscall calls ima_post_path_mknod()). Therefore as fallback we force IMA to use the default builtin Kconfig hash algorithm. Fixed crash: $ grep CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD4 .config CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD4=m [ 0.000000] Command line: BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-4.12.14-2.3-default root=UUID=74ae8202-9ca7-4e39-813b-22287ec52f7a video=1024x768-16 plymouth.ignore-serial-consoles console=ttyS0 console=tty resume=/dev/disk/by-path/pci-0000:00:07.0-part3 splash=silent showopts ima_hash=md4 ... [ 1.545190] ima: Can not allocate md4 (reason: -2) ... [ 2.610120] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 2.611903] IP: ima_match_policy+0x23/0x390 [ 2.612967] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 2.613080] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 2.613080] Modules linked in: autofs4 [ 2.613080] Supported: Yes [ 2.613080] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 4.12.14-2.3-default #1 [ 2.613080] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.0.0-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [ 2.613080] task: ffff88003e2d0040 task.stack: ffffc90000190000 [ 2.613080] RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x23/0x390 [ 2.613080] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000193e88 EFLAGS: 00010296 [ 2.613080] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000000c RCX: 0000000000000004 [ 2.613080] RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff880037071728 [ 2.613080] RBP: 0000000000008000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 2.613080] R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 61c8864680b583eb R12: 00005580ff10086f [ 2.613080] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000008000 [ 2.613080] FS: 00007f5c1da08940(0000) GS:ffff88003fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 2.613080] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 2.613080] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000037002000 CR4: 00000000003406f0 [ 2.613080] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 2.613080] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 2.613080] Call Trace: [ 2.613080] ? shmem_mknod+0xbf/0xd0 [ 2.613080] ima_post_path_mknod+0x1c/0x40 [ 2.613080] SyS_mknod+0x210/0x220 [ 2.613080] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa5 [ 2.613080] RIP: 0033:0x7f5c1bfde570 [ 2.613080] RSP: 002b:00007ffde1c90dc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000085 [ 2.613080] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f5c1bfde570 [ 2.613080] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000008000 RDI: 00005580ff10086f [ 2.613080] RBP: 00007ffde1c91040 R08: 00005580ff10086f R09: 0000000000000000 [ 2.613080] R10: 0000000000104000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005580ffb99660 [ 2.613080] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000002 [ 2.613080] Code: 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 41 56 44 8d 14 09 41 55 41 54 55 53 44 89 d3 09 cb 48 83 ec 38 48 8b 05 c5 03 29 01 <4c> 8b 20 4c 39 e0 0f 84 d7 01 00 00 4c 89 44 24 08 89 54 24 20 [ 2.613080] RIP: ima_match_policy+0x23/0x390 RSP: ffffc90000193e88 [ 2.613080] CR2: 0000000000000000 [ 2.613080] ---[ end trace 9a9f0a8a73079f6a ]--- [ 2.673052] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000009 [ 2.673052] [ 2.675337] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 2.676405] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000009 Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-03-25ima: Add smackfs to the default appraise/measure listMartin Townsend1-0/+2
This is required to use SMACK and IMA/EVM together. Add it to the default nomeasure/noappraise list like other pseudo filesystems. Signed-off-by: Martin Townsend <mtownsend1973@gmail.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-03-25evm: check for remount ro in progress before writingSascha Hauer1-2/+6
EVM might update the evm xattr while the VFS performs a remount to readonly mode. This is not properly checked for, additionally check the s_readonly_remount superblock flag before writing. The bug can for example be observed with UBIFS. UBIFS checks the free space on the device before and after a remount. With EVM enabled the free space sometimes differs between both checks. Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-03-25ima: Improvements in ima_appraise_measurement()Thiago Jung Bauermann1-13/+22
Replace nested ifs in the EVM xattr verification logic with a switch statement, making the code easier to understand. Also, add comments to the if statements in the out section and constify the cause variable. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
2018-03-25ima: Simplify ima_eventsig_init()Thiago Jung Bauermann1-8/+3
The "goto out" statement doesn't have any purpose since there's no cleanup to be done when returning early, so remove it. This also makes the rc variable unnecessary so remove it as well. Also, the xattr_len and fmt variables are redundant so remove them as well. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-03-25integrity: Remove unused macro IMA_ACTION_RULE_FLAGSThiago Jung Bauermann1-1/+0
This macro isn't used anymore since commit 0d73a55208e9 ("ima: re-introduce own integrity cache lock"), so remove it. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-03-25ima: drop vla in ima_audit_measurement()Tycho Andersen1-6/+10
In keeping with the directive to get rid of VLAs [1], let's drop the VLA from ima_audit_measurement(). We need to adjust the return type of ima_audit_measurement, because now this function can fail if an allocation fails. [1]: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/3/7/621 v2: just use audit_log_format instead of doing a second allocation v3: ignore failures in ima_audit_measurement() Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-03-25ima: Fix Kconfig to select TPM 2.0 CRB interfaceJiandi An1-0/+1
TPM_CRB driver provides TPM CRB 2.0 support. If it is built as a module, the TPM chip is registered after IMA init. tpm_pcr_read() in IMA fails and displays the following message even though eventually there is a TPM chip on the system. ima: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass! (rc=-19) Fix IMA Kconfig to select TPM_CRB so TPM_CRB driver is built in the kernel and initializes before IMA. Signed-off-by: Jiandi An <anjiandi@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-03-23evm: Constify *integrity_status_msg[]Hernán Gonzalez1-1/+1
There is no gain from doing this except for some self-documenting. Signed-off-by: Hernán Gonzalez <hernan@vanguardiasur.com.ar> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-03-23evm: Move evm_hmac and evm_hash from evm_main.c to evm_crypto.cHernán Gonzalez3-4/+3
These variables are not used where they are was defined. There is no point in declaring them there as extern. Move and constify them, saving 2 bytes. Function old new delta init_desc 273 271 -2 Total: Before=2112094, After=2112092, chg -0.00% Signed-off-by: Hernán Gonzalez <hernan@vanguardiasur.com.ar> Tested-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2018-03-23ima: fail signature verification based on policyMimi Zohar4-6/+14
This patch addresses the fuse privileged mounted filesystems in environments which are unwilling to accept the risk of trusting the signature verification and want to always fail safe, but are for example using a pre-built kernel. This patch defines a new builtin policy named "fail_securely", which can be specified on the boot command line as an argument to "ima_policy=". Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Cc: Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io> Cc: Alban Crequy <alban@kinvolk.io> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>