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2018-10-26KEYS: asym_tpm: Add support for the sign operation [ver #2]Denis Kenzior1-1/+155
The sign operation can operate in a non-hashed mode by running the RSA sign operation directly on the input. This assumes that the input is less than key_size_in_bytes - 11. Since the TPM performs its own PKCS1 padding, it isn't possible to support 'raw' mode, only 'pkcs1'. Alternatively, a hashed version is also possible. In this variant the input is hashed (by userspace) via the selected hash function first. Then this implementation takes care of converting the hash to ASN.1 format and the sign operation is performed on the result. This is similar to the implementation inside crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c. ASN1 templates were copied from crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c. There seems to be no easy way to expose that functionality, but likely the templates should be shared somehow. The sign operation is implemented via TPM_Sign operation on the TPM. It is assumed that the TPM wrapped key provided uses TPM_SS_RSASSAPKCS1v15_DER signature scheme. This allows the TPM_Sign operation to work on data up to key_len_in_bytes - 11 bytes long. In theory, we could also use TPM_Unbind instead of TPM_Sign, but we would have to manually pkcs1 pad the digest first. Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement tpm_sign [ver #2]Denis Kenzior1-0/+87
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement signature verification [ver #2]Denis Kenzior1-6/+100
This patch implements the verify_signature operation. The public key portion extracted from the TPM key blob is used. The operation is performed entirely in software using the crypto API. Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement the decrypt operation [ver #2]Denis Kenzior1-1/+57
This patch implements the pkey_decrypt operation using the private key blob. The blob is first loaded into the TPM via tpm_loadkey2. Once the handle is obtained, tpm_unbind operation is used to decrypt the data on the TPM and the result is returned. The key loaded by tpm_loadkey2 is then evicted via tpm_flushspecific operation. This patch assumes that the SRK authorization is a well known 20-byte of zeros and the same holds for the key authorization of the provided key. Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement tpm_unbind [ver #2]Denis Kenzior1-0/+82
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26KEYS: asym_tpm: Add loadkey2 and flushspecific [ver #2]Denis Kenzior1-0/+94
This commit adds TPM_LoadKey2 and TPM_FlushSpecific operations. Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26KEYS: trusted: Expose common functionality [ver #2]Denis Kenzior1-0/+1
This patch exposes some common functionality needed to send TPM commands. Several functions from keys/trusted.c are exposed for use by the new tpm key subtype and a module dependency is introduced. In the future, common functionality between the trusted key type and the asym_tpm subtype should be factored out into a common utility library. Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement encryption operation [ver #2]Denis Kenzior1-0/+84
This patch impelements the pkey_encrypt operation. The public key portion extracted from the TPM key blob is used. The operation is performed entirely in software using the crypto API. Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement pkey_query [ver #2]Denis Kenzior1-0/+135
This commit implements the pkey_query operation. This is accomplished by utilizing the public key portion to obtain max encryption size information for the operations that utilize the public key (encrypt, verify). The private key size extracted from the TPM_Key data structure is used to fill the information where the private key is used (decrypt, sign). The kernel uses a DER/BER format for public keys and does not support setting the key via the raw binary form. To get around this a simple DER/BER formatter is implemented which stores the DER/BER formatted key and exponent in a temporary buffer for use by the crypto API. The only exponent supported currently is 65537. This holds true for other Linux TPM tools such as 'create_tpm_key' and trousers-openssl_tpm_engine. Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26KEYS: Add parser for TPM-based keys [ver #2]Denis Kenzior4-0/+127
For TPM based keys, the only standard seems to be described here: http://david.woodhou.se/draft-woodhouse-cert-best-practice.html#rfc.section.4.4 Quote from the relevant section: "Rather, a common form of storage for "wrapped" keys is to encode the binary TCPA_KEY structure in a single ASN.1 OCTET-STRING, and store the result in PEM format with the tag "-----BEGIN TSS KEY BLOB-----". " This patch implements the above behavior. It is assumed that the PEM encoding is stripped out by userspace and only the raw DER/BER format is provided. This is similar to how PKCS7, PKCS8 and X.509 keys are handled. Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26KEYS: asym_tpm: extract key size & public key [ver #2]Denis Kenzior1-0/+112
The parsed BER/DER blob obtained from user space contains a TPM_Key structure. This structure has some information about the key as well as the public key portion. This patch extracts this information for future use. Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26KEYS: asym_tpm: add skeleton for asym_tpm [ver #2]Denis Kenzior3-0/+102
This patch adds the basic skeleton for the asym_tpm asymmetric key subtype. Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad: Allow hash to be optional [ver #2]Denis Kenzior1-18/+41
The original pkcs1pad implementation allowed to pad/unpad raw RSA output. However, this has been taken out in commit: commit c0d20d22e0ad ("crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Require hash to be present") This patch restored this ability as it is needed by the asymmetric key implementation. Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26KEYS: Implement PKCS#8 RSA Private Key parser [ver #2]David Howells4-0/+231
Implement PKCS#8 RSA Private Key format [RFC 5208] parser for the asymmetric key type. For the moment, this will only support unencrypted DER blobs. PEM and decryption can be added later. PKCS#8 keys can be loaded like this: openssl pkcs8 -in private_key.pem -topk8 -nocrypt -outform DER | \ keyctl padd asymmetric foo @s Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26KEYS: Implement encrypt, decrypt and sign for software asymmetric key [ver #2]David Howells1-1/+81
Implement the encrypt, decrypt and sign operations for the software asymmetric key subtype. This mostly involves offloading the call to the crypto layer. Note that the decrypt and sign operations require a private key to be supplied. Encrypt (and also verify) will work with either a public or a private key. A public key can be supplied with an X.509 certificate and a private key can be supplied using a PKCS#8 blob: # j=`openssl pkcs8 -in ~/pkcs7/firmwarekey2.priv -topk8 -nocrypt -outform DER | keyctl padd asymmetric foo @s` # keyctl pkey_query $j - enc=pkcs1 key_size=4096 max_data_size=512 max_sig_size=512 max_enc_size=512 max_dec_size=512 encrypt=y decrypt=y sign=y verify=y # keyctl pkey_encrypt $j 0 data enc=pkcs1 >/tmp/enc # keyctl pkey_decrypt $j 0 /tmp/enc enc=pkcs1 >/tmp/dec # cmp data /tmp/dec # keyctl pkey_sign $j 0 data enc=pkcs1 hash=sha1 >/tmp/sig # keyctl pkey_verify $j 0 data /tmp/sig enc=pkcs1 hash=sha1 # Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26KEYS: Allow the public_key struct to hold a private key [ver #2]David Howells1-2/+12
Put a flag in the public_key struct to indicate if the structure is holding a private key. The private key must be held ASN.1 encoded in the format specified in RFC 3447 A.1.2. This is the form required by crypto/rsa.c. The software encryption subtype's verification and query functions then need to select the appropriate crypto function to set the key. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26KEYS: Provide software public key query function [ver #2]David Howells1-17/+82
Provide a query function for the software public key implementation. This permits information about such a key to be obtained using query_asymmetric_key() or KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26KEYS: Make the X.509 and PKCS7 parsers supply the sig encoding type [ver #2]David Howells2-12/+10
Make the X.509 and PKCS7 parsers fill in the signature encoding type field recently added to the public_key_signature struct. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26KEYS: Provide missing asymmetric key subops for new key type ops [ver #2]David Howells3-0/+141
Provide the missing asymmetric key subops for new key type ops. This include query, encrypt, decrypt and create signature. Verify signature already exists. Also provided are accessor functions for this: int query_asymmetric_key(const struct key *key, struct kernel_pkey_query *info); int encrypt_blob(struct kernel_pkey_params *params, const void *data, void *enc); int decrypt_blob(struct kernel_pkey_params *params, const void *enc, void *data); int create_signature(struct kernel_pkey_params *params, const void *data, void *enc); The public_key_signature struct gains an encoding field to carry the encoding for verify_signature(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-25Merge branch 'linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds36-2426/+1174
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6 Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu: "API: - Remove VLA usage - Add cryptostat user-space interface - Add notifier for new crypto algorithms Algorithms: - Add OFB mode - Remove speck Drivers: - Remove x86/sha*-mb as they are buggy - Remove pcbc(aes) from x86/aesni - Improve performance of arm/ghash-ce by up to 85% - Implement CTS-CBC in arm64/aes-blk, faster by up to 50% - Remove PMULL based arm64/crc32 driver - Use PMULL in arm64/crct10dif - Add aes-ctr support in s5p-sss - Add caam/qi2 driver Others: - Pick better transform if one becomes available in crc-t10dif" * 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (124 commits) crypto: chelsio - Update ntx queue received from cxgb4 crypto: ccree - avoid implicit enum conversion crypto: caam - add SPDX license identifier to all files crypto: caam/qi - simplify CGR allocation, freeing crypto: mxs-dcp - make symbols 'sha1_null_hash' and 'sha256_null_hash' static crypto: arm64/aes-blk - ensure XTS mask is always loaded crypto: testmgr - fix sizeof() on COMP_BUF_SIZE crypto: chtls - remove set but not used variable 'csk' crypto: axis - fix platform_no_drv_owner.cocci warnings crypto: x86/aes-ni - fix build error following fpu template removal crypto: arm64/aes - fix handling sub-block CTS-CBC inputs crypto: caam/qi2 - avoid double export crypto: mxs-dcp - Fix AES issues crypto: mxs-dcp - Fix SHA null hashes and output length crypto: mxs-dcp - Implement sha import/export crypto: aegis/generic - fix for big endian systems crypto: morus/generic - fix for big endian systems crypto: lrw - fix rebase error after out of bounds fix crypto: cavium/nitrox - use pci_alloc_irq_vectors() while enabling MSI-X. crypto: cavium/nitrox - NITROX command queue changes. ...
2018-10-23Revert "net: simplify sock_poll_wait"Karsten Graul1-1/+1
This reverts commit dd979b4df817e9976f18fb6f9d134d6bc4a3c317. This broke tcp_poll for SMC fallback: An AF_SMC socket establishes an internal TCP socket for the initial handshake with the remote peer. Whenever the SMC connection can not be established this TCP socket is used as a fallback. All socket operations on the SMC socket are then forwarded to the TCP socket. In case of poll, the file->private_data pointer references the SMC socket because the TCP socket has no file assigned. This causes tcp_poll to wait on the wrong socket. Signed-off-by: Karsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-10-12crypto: testmgr - fix sizeof() on COMP_BUF_SIZEMichael Schupikov1-3/+3
After allocation, output and decomp_output both point to memory chunks of size COMP_BUF_SIZE. Then, only the first bytes are zeroed out using sizeof(COMP_BUF_SIZE) as parameter to memset(), because sizeof(COMP_BUF_SIZE) provides the size of the constant and not the size of allocated memory. Instead, the whole allocated memory is meant to be zeroed out. Use COMP_BUF_SIZE as parameter to memset() directly in order to accomplish this. Fixes: 336073840a872 ("crypto: testmgr - Allow different compression results") Signed-off-by: Michael Schupikov <michael@schupikov.de> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-10-08crypto: aegis/generic - fix for big endian systemsArd Biesheuvel1-11/+9
Use the correct __le32 annotation and accessors to perform the single round of AES encryption performed inside the AEGIS transform. Otherwise, tcrypt reports: alg: aead: Test 1 failed on encryption for aegis128-generic 00000000: 6c 25 25 4a 3c 10 1d 27 2b c1 d4 84 9a ef 7f 6e alg: aead: Test 1 failed on encryption for aegis128l-generic 00000000: cd c6 e3 b8 a0 70 9d 8e c2 4f 6f fe 71 42 df 28 alg: aead: Test 1 failed on encryption for aegis256-generic 00000000: aa ed 07 b1 96 1d e9 e6 f2 ed b5 8e 1c 5f dc 1c Fixes: f606a88e5823 ("crypto: aegis - Add generic AEGIS AEAD implementations") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.18+ Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-10-08crypto: morus/generic - fix for big endian systemsArd Biesheuvel2-17/+6
Omit the endian swabbing when folding the lengths of the assoc and crypt input buffers into the state to finalize the tag. This is not necessary given that the memory representation of the state is in machine native endianness already. This fixes an error reported by tcrypt running on a big endian system: alg: aead: Test 2 failed on encryption for morus640-generic 00000000: a8 30 ef fb e6 26 eb 23 b0 87 dd 98 57 f3 e1 4b 00000010: 21 alg: aead: Test 2 failed on encryption for morus1280-generic 00000000: 88 19 1b fb 1c 29 49 0e ee 82 2f cb 97 a6 a5 ee 00000010: 5f Fixes: 396be41f16fd ("crypto: morus - Add generic MORUS AEAD implementations") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.18+ Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-10-05crypto: lrw - fix rebase error after out of bounds fixArd Biesheuvel1-4/+3
Due to an unfortunate interaction between commit fbe1a850b3b1 ("crypto: lrw - Fix out-of bounds access on counter overflow") and commit c778f96bf347 ("crypto: lrw - Optimize tweak computation"), we ended up with a version of next_index() that always returns 127. Fixes: c778f96bf347 ("crypto: lrw - Optimize tweak computation") Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-10-05crypto: x86/aes-ni - remove special handling of AES in PCBC modeArd Biesheuvel1-1/+1
For historical reasons, the AES-NI based implementation of the PCBC chaining mode uses a special FPU chaining mode wrapper template to amortize the FPU start/stop overhead over multiple blocks. When this FPU wrapper was introduced, it supported widely used chaining modes such as XTS and CTR (as well as LRW), but currently, PCBC is the only remaining user. Since there are no known users of pcbc(aes) in the kernel, let's remove this special driver, and rely on the generic pcbc driver to encapsulate the AES-NI core cipher. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-28crypto: tcrypt - add OFB functional testsGilad Ben-Yossef1-0/+1
We already have OFB test vectors and tcrypt OFB speed tests. Add OFB functional tests to tcrypt as well. Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-28crypto: ofb - add output feedback modeGilad Ben-Yossef3-0/+238
Add a generic version of output feedback mode. We already have support of several hardware based transformations of this mode and the needed test vectors but we somehow missed adding a generic software one. Fix this now. Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-28crypto: testmgr - update sm4 test vectorsGilad Ben-Yossef4-7/+144
Add additional test vectors from "The SM4 Blockcipher Algorithm And Its Modes Of Operations" draft-ribose-cfrg-sm4-10 and register cipher speed tests for sm4. Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-28crypto: tcrypt - remove remnants of pcomp-based zlibHoria Geantă2-8/+1
Commit 110492183c4b ("crypto: compress - remove unused pcomp interface") removed pcomp interface but missed cleaning up tcrypt. Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-28crypto: user - Implement a generic crypto statisticsCorentin Labbe7-7/+507
This patch implement a generic way to get statistics about all crypto usages. Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-28crypto: cryptd - Remove VLA usage of skcipherKees Cook1-15/+17
In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this replaces struct crypto_skcipher and SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() usage with struct crypto_sync_skcipher and SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(), which uses a fixed stack size. [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-28crypto: null - Remove VLA usage of skcipherKees Cook7-28/+27
In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this replaces struct crypto_skcipher and SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() usage with struct crypto_sync_skcipher and SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(), which uses a fixed stack size. [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-28crypto: skcipher - Introduce crypto_sync_skcipherKees Cook1-0/+24
In preparation for removal of VLAs due to skcipher requests on the stack via SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() usage, this introduces the infrastructure for the "sync skcipher" tfm, which is for handling the on-stack cases of skcipher, which are always non-ASYNC and have a known limited request size. The crypto API additions: struct crypto_sync_skcipher (wrapper for struct crypto_skcipher) crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher() crypto_free_sync_skcipher() crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey() crypto_sync_skcipher_get_flags() crypto_sync_skcipher_set_flags() crypto_sync_skcipher_clear_flags() crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize() crypto_sync_skcipher_ivsize() crypto_sync_skcipher_reqtfm() skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm() SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() (with tfm type check) Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-28crypto: fix a memory leak in rsa-kcs1pad's encryption modeDan Aloni1-9/+0
The encryption mode of pkcs1pad never uses out_sg and out_buf, so there's no need to allocate the buffer, which presently is not even being freed. CC: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> CC: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Dan Aloni <dan@kernelim.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-21crypto: lrw - Do not use auxiliary bufferOndrej Mosnacek1-229/+51
This patch simplifies the LRW template to recompute the LRW tweaks from scratch in the second pass and thus also removes the need to allocate a dynamic buffer using kmalloc(). As discussed at [1], the use of kmalloc causes deadlocks with dm-crypt. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS (x86_64) Performed using: https://gitlab.com/omos/linux-crypto-bench Crypto driver used: lrw(ecb-aes-aesni) The results show that the new code has about the same performance as the old code. For 512-byte message it seems to be even slightly faster, but that might be just noise. Before: ALGORITHM KEY (b) DATA (B) TIME ENC (ns) TIME DEC (ns) lrw(aes) 256 64 200 203 lrw(aes) 320 64 202 204 lrw(aes) 384 64 204 205 lrw(aes) 256 512 415 415 lrw(aes) 320 512 432 440 lrw(aes) 384 512 449 451 lrw(aes) 256 4096 1838 1995 lrw(aes) 320 4096 2123 1980 lrw(aes) 384 4096 2100 2119 lrw(aes) 256 16384 7183 6954 lrw(aes) 320 16384 7844 7631 lrw(aes) 384 16384 8256 8126 lrw(aes) 256 32768 14772 14484 lrw(aes) 320 32768 15281 15431 lrw(aes) 384 32768 16469 16293 After: ALGORITHM KEY (b) DATA (B) TIME ENC (ns) TIME DEC (ns) lrw(aes) 256 64 197 196 lrw(aes) 320 64 200 197 lrw(aes) 384 64 203 199 lrw(aes) 256 512 385 380 lrw(aes) 320 512 401 395 lrw(aes) 384 512 415 415 lrw(aes) 256 4096 1869 1846 lrw(aes) 320 4096 2080 1981 lrw(aes) 384 4096 2160 2109 lrw(aes) 256 16384 7077 7127 lrw(aes) 320 16384 7807 7766 lrw(aes) 384 16384 8108 8357 lrw(aes) 256 32768 14111 14454 lrw(aes) 320 32768 15268 15082 lrw(aes) 384 32768 16581 16250 [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/8/23/1315 Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-21crypto: lrw - Optimize tweak computationOndrej Mosnacek1-24/+37
This patch rewrites the tweak computation to a slightly simpler method that performs less bswaps. Based on performance measurements the new code seems to provide slightly better performance than the old one. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS (x86_64) Performed using: https://gitlab.com/omos/linux-crypto-bench Crypto driver used: lrw(ecb-aes-aesni) Before: ALGORITHM KEY (b) DATA (B) TIME ENC (ns) TIME DEC (ns) lrw(aes) 256 64 204 286 lrw(aes) 320 64 227 203 lrw(aes) 384 64 208 204 lrw(aes) 256 512 441 439 lrw(aes) 320 512 456 455 lrw(aes) 384 512 469 483 lrw(aes) 256 4096 2136 2190 lrw(aes) 320 4096 2161 2213 lrw(aes) 384 4096 2295 2369 lrw(aes) 256 16384 7692 7868 lrw(aes) 320 16384 8230 8691 lrw(aes) 384 16384 8971 8813 lrw(aes) 256 32768 15336 15560 lrw(aes) 320 32768 16410 16346 lrw(aes) 384 32768 18023 17465 After: ALGORITHM KEY (b) DATA (B) TIME ENC (ns) TIME DEC (ns) lrw(aes) 256 64 200 203 lrw(aes) 320 64 202 204 lrw(aes) 384 64 204 205 lrw(aes) 256 512 415 415 lrw(aes) 320 512 432 440 lrw(aes) 384 512 449 451 lrw(aes) 256 4096 1838 1995 lrw(aes) 320 4096 2123 1980 lrw(aes) 384 4096 2100 2119 lrw(aes) 256 16384 7183 6954 lrw(aes) 320 16384 7844 7631 lrw(aes) 384 16384 8256 8126 lrw(aes) 256 32768 14772 14484 lrw(aes) 320 32768 15281 15431 lrw(aes) 384 32768 16469 16293 Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-21crypto: testmgr - Add test for LRW counter wrap-aroundOndrej Mosnacek1-0/+21
This patch adds a test vector for lrw(aes) that triggers wrap-around of the counter, which is a tricky corner case. Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-21crypto: lrw - Fix out-of bounds access on counter overflowOndrej Mosnacek1-1/+6
When the LRW block counter overflows, the current implementation returns 128 as the index to the precomputed multiplication table, which has 128 entries. This patch fixes it to return the correct value (127). Fixes: 64470f1b8510 ("[CRYPTO] lrw: Liskov Rivest Wagner, a tweakable narrow block cipher mode") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.20+ Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-21crypto: tcrypt - fix ghash-generic speed testHoria Geantă1-0/+3
ghash is a keyed hash algorithm, thus setkey needs to be called. Otherwise the following error occurs: $ modprobe tcrypt mode=318 sec=1 testing speed of async ghash-generic (ghash-generic) tcrypt: test 0 ( 16 byte blocks, 16 bytes per update, 1 updates): tcrypt: hashing failed ret=-126 Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.6+ Fixes: 0660511c0bee ("crypto: tcrypt - Use ahash") Tested-by: Franck Lenormand <franck.lenormand@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-21crypto: chacha20 - Fix chacha20_block() keystream alignment (again)Eric Biggers1-3/+4
In commit 9f480faec58c ("crypto: chacha20 - Fix keystream alignment for chacha20_block()"), I had missed that chacha20_block() can be called directly on the buffer passed to get_random_bytes(), which can have any alignment. So, while my commit didn't break anything, it didn't fully solve the alignment problems. Revert my solution and just update chacha20_block() to use put_unaligned_le32(), so the output buffer need not be aligned. This is simpler, and on many CPUs it's the same speed. But, I kept the 'tmp' buffers in extract_crng_user() and _get_random_bytes() 4-byte aligned, since that alignment is actually needed for _crng_backtrack_protect() too. Reported-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-21crypto: xts - Drop use of auxiliary bufferOndrej Mosnacek1-223/+46
Since commit acb9b159c784 ("crypto: gf128mul - define gf128mul_x_* in gf128mul.h"), the gf128mul_x_*() functions are very fast and therefore caching the computed XTS tweaks has only negligible advantage over computing them twice. In fact, since the current caching implementation limits the size of the calls to the child ecb(...) algorithm to PAGE_SIZE (usually 4096 B), it is often actually slower than the simple recomputing implementation. This patch simplifies the XTS template to recompute the XTS tweaks from scratch in the second pass and thus also removes the need to allocate a dynamic buffer using kmalloc(). As discussed at [1], the use of kmalloc causes deadlocks with dm-crypt. PERFORMANCE RESULTS I measured time to encrypt/decrypt a memory buffer of varying sizes with xts(ecb-aes-aesni) using a tool I wrote ([2]) and the results suggest that after this patch the performance is either better or comparable for both small and large buffers. Note that there is a lot of noise in the measurements, but the overall difference is easy to see. Old code: ALGORITHM KEY (b) DATA (B) TIME ENC (ns) TIME DEC (ns) xts(aes) 256 64 331 328 xts(aes) 384 64 332 333 xts(aes) 512 64 338 348 xts(aes) 256 512 889 920 xts(aes) 384 512 1019 993 xts(aes) 512 512 1032 990 xts(aes) 256 4096 2152 2292 xts(aes) 384 4096 2453 2597 xts(aes) 512 4096 3041 2641 xts(aes) 256 16384 9443 8027 xts(aes) 384 16384 8536 8925 xts(aes) 512 16384 9232 9417 xts(aes) 256 32768 16383 14897 xts(aes) 384 32768 17527 16102 xts(aes) 512 32768 18483 17322 New code: ALGORITHM KEY (b) DATA (B) TIME ENC (ns) TIME DEC (ns) xts(aes) 256 64 328 324 xts(aes) 384 64 324 319 xts(aes) 512 64 320 322 xts(aes) 256 512 476 473 xts(aes) 384 512 509 492 xts(aes) 512 512 531 514 xts(aes) 256 4096 2132 1829 xts(aes) 384 4096 2357 2055 xts(aes) 512 4096 2178 2027 xts(aes) 256 16384 6920 6983 xts(aes) 384 16384 8597 7505 xts(aes) 512 16384 7841 8164 xts(aes) 256 32768 13468 12307 xts(aes) 384 32768 14808 13402 xts(aes) 512 32768 15753 14636 [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/8/23/1315 [2] https://gitlab.com/omos/linux-crypto-bench Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-04crypto: api - Introduce notifier for new crypto algorithmsMartin K. Petersen3-8/+4
Introduce a facility that can be used to receive a notification callback when a new algorithm becomes available. This can be used by existing crypto registrations to trigger a switch from a software-only algorithm to a hardware-accelerated version. A new CRYPTO_MSG_ALG_LOADED state is introduced to the existing crypto notification chain, and the register/unregister functions are exported so they can be called by subsystems outside of crypto. Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Suggested-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-04crypto: x86 - remove SHA multibuffer routines and mcryptdArd Biesheuvel3-738/+0
As it turns out, the AVX2 multibuffer SHA routines are currently broken [0], in a way that would have likely been noticed if this code were in wide use. Since the code is too complicated to be maintained by anyone except the original authors, and since the performance benefits for real-world use cases are debatable to begin with, it is better to drop it entirely for the moment. [0] https://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=153476243825350&w=2 Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: Megha Dey <megha.dey@linux.intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-04crypto: shash - Remove VLA usage in unaligned hashingKees Cook1-11/+16
In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this uses the newly defined max alignment to perform unaligned hashing to avoid VLAs, and drops the helper function while adding sanity checks on the resulting buffer sizes. Additionally, the __aligned_largest macro is removed since this helper was the only user. [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-04crypto: api - Introduce generic max blocksize and alignmaskKees Cook1-1/+6
In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this exposes a new general upper bound on crypto blocksize and alignmask (higher than for the existing cipher limits) for VLA removal, and introduces new checks. At present, the highest cra_alignmask in the kernel is 63. The highest cra_blocksize is 144 (SHA3_224_BLOCK_SIZE, 18 8-byte words). For the new blocksize limit, I went with 160 (20 8-byte words). [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-04crypto: hash - Remove VLA usageKees Cook3-6/+6
In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this removes the VLAs in SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK (via crypto_shash_descsize()) by using the maximum allowable size (which is now more clearly captured in a macro), along with a few other cases. Similar limits are turned into macros as well. A review of existing sizes shows that SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE (64) is the largest digest size and that sizeof(struct sha3_state) (360) is the largest descriptor size. The corresponding maximums are reduced. [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-04crypto: ccm - Remove VLA usageArd Biesheuvel1-3/+6
In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this drops AHASH_REQUEST_ON_STACK by preallocating the ahash request area combined with the skcipher area (which are not used at the same time). [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-04crypto: xcbc - Remove VLA usageKees Cook1-3/+5
In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this uses the maximum blocksize and adds a sanity check. For xcbc, the blocksize must always be 16, so use that, since it's already being enforced during instantiation. [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-04crypto: speck - remove SpeckJason A. Donenfeld5-1084/+0
These are unused, undesired, and have never actually been used by anybody. The original authors of this code have changed their mind about its inclusion. While originally proposed for disk encryption on low-end devices, the idea was discarded [1] in favor of something else before that could really get going. Therefore, this patch removes Speck. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=153359499015659 Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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