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Add predicate functions for having arch_get_random[_seed]*(). The
only current use is to avoid the loop in arch_random_refill() when
arch_get_random_seed_long() is unavailable.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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Upcoming Intel silicon adds a new RDSEED instruction, which is similar
to RDRAND but provides a stronger guarantee: unlike RDRAND, RDSEED
will always reseed the PRNG from the true random number source between
each read. Thus, the output of RDSEED is guaranteed to be 100%
entropic, unlike RDRAND which is only architecturally guaranteed to be
1/512 entropic (although in practice is much more.)
The RDSEED instruction takes the same time to execute as RDRAND, but
RDSEED unlike RDRAND can legitimately return failure (CF=0) due to
entropy exhaustion if too many threads on too many cores are hammering
the RDSEED instruction at the same time. Therefore, we have to be
more conservative and only use it in places where we can tolerate
failures.
This patch introduces the primitives arch_get_random_seed_{int,long}()
but does not use it yet.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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Adds potential sources of randomness: RDRAND, RDTSC, or the i8254.
This moves the pre-alternatives inline rdrand function into the header so
both pieces of code can use it. Availability of RDRAND is then controlled
by CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM, if someone wants to disable it even for kASLR.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1381450698-28710-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
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If the CPU declares that RDRAND is available, go through a guranteed
reseed sequence, and make sure that it is actually working (producing
data.) If it does not, disable the CPU feature flag.
Allow RDRAND to be disabled on the command line (as opposed to at
compile time) for a user who has special requirements with regards to
random numbers.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
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Architectural inlines to get random ints and longs using the RDRAND
instruction.
Intel has introduced a new RDRAND instruction, a Digital Random Number
Generator (DRNG), which is functionally an high bandwidth entropy
source, cryptographic whitener, and integrity monitor all built into
hardware. This enables RDRAND to be used directly, bypassing the
kernel random number pool.
For technical documentation, see:
http://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/download-the-latest-bull-mountain-software-implementation-guide/
In this patch, this is *only* used for the nonblocking random number
pool. RDRAND is a nonblocking source, similar to our /dev/urandom,
and is therefore not a direct replacement for /dev/random. The
architectural hooks presented in the previous patch only feed the
kernel internal users, which only use the nonblocking pool, and so
this is not a problem.
Since this instruction is available in userspace, there is no reason
to have a /dev/hw_rng device driver for the purpose of feeding rngd.
This is especially so since RDRAND is a nonblocking source, and needs
additional whitening and reduction (see the above technical
documentation for details) in order to be of "pure entropy source"
quality.
The CONFIG_EXPERT compile-time option can be used to disable this use
of RDRAND.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Originally-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
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