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-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c4
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm.h9
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c75
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c67
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c20
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/iint.c4
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c5
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c46
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c96
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c32
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c11
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/integrity.h41
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyring.c7
-rw-r--r--security/keys/trusted.c35
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/netlabel.h3
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netlabel.c3
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c21
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack.h1
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_access.c40
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c10
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/audit.c2
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/common.c4
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/common.h6
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c2
27 files changed, 380 insertions, 170 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index d4fa04d91439..4d202b73a0e1 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -571,10 +571,10 @@ static int ns_revision_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
return 0;
}
-static unsigned int ns_revision_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *pt)
+static __poll_t ns_revision_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *pt)
{
struct aa_revision *rev = file->private_data;
- unsigned int mask = 0;
+ __poll_t mask = 0;
if (rev) {
mutex_lock_nested(&rev->ns->lock, rev->ns->level);
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
index 241aca315b0c..04825393facb 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
@@ -23,9 +23,12 @@
#define EVM_INIT_HMAC 0x0001
#define EVM_INIT_X509 0x0002
-#define EVM_SETUP 0x80000000 /* userland has signaled key load */
+#define EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES 0x0004
+#define EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE 0x80000000 /* userland has signaled key load */
-#define EVM_INIT_MASK (EVM_INIT_HMAC | EVM_INIT_X509 | EVM_SETUP)
+#define EVM_KEY_MASK (EVM_INIT_HMAC | EVM_INIT_X509)
+#define EVM_INIT_MASK (EVM_INIT_HMAC | EVM_INIT_X509 | EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE | \
+ EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
extern int evm_initialized;
extern char *evm_hmac;
@@ -51,7 +54,7 @@ int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
const char *req_xattr_value,
- size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
+ size_t req_xattr_value_len, char type, char *digest);
int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr,
char *hmac_val);
int evm_init_secfs(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index bcd64baf8788..691f3e09154c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ out:
* protection.)
*/
static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
- char *digest)
+ char type, char *digest)
{
struct h_misc {
unsigned long ino;
@@ -149,8 +149,13 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
} hmac_misc;
memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof(hmac_misc));
- hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino;
- hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation;
+ /* Don't include the inode or generation number in portable
+ * signatures
+ */
+ if (type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) {
+ hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino;
+ hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation;
+ }
/* The hmac uid and gid must be encoded in the initial user
* namespace (not the filesystems user namespace) as encoding
* them in the filesystems user namespace allows an attack
@@ -163,7 +168,8 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid);
hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode;
crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc));
- if (evm_hmac_attrs & EVM_ATTR_FSUUID)
+ if ((evm_hmac_attrs & EVM_ATTR_FSUUID) &&
+ type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
crypto_shash_update(desc, &inode->i_sb->s_uuid.b[0],
sizeof(inode->i_sb->s_uuid));
crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
@@ -189,6 +195,7 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
char *xattr_value = NULL;
int error;
int size;
+ bool ima_present = false;
if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -199,11 +206,18 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
error = -ENODATA;
for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++) {
+ bool is_ima = false;
+
+ if (strcmp(*xattrname, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0)
+ is_ima = true;
+
if ((req_xattr_name && req_xattr_value)
&& !strcmp(*xattrname, req_xattr_name)) {
error = 0;
crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)req_xattr_value,
req_xattr_value_len);
+ if (is_ima)
+ ima_present = true;
continue;
}
size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, *xattrname,
@@ -218,9 +232,14 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
error = 0;
xattr_size = size;
crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)xattr_value, xattr_size);
+ if (is_ima)
+ ima_present = true;
}
- hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, digest);
+ hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, type, digest);
+ /* Portable EVM signatures must include an IMA hash */
+ if (type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && !ima_present)
+ return -EPERM;
out:
kfree(xattr_value);
kfree(desc);
@@ -232,17 +251,45 @@ int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
char *digest)
{
return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value,
- req_xattr_value_len, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, digest);
+ req_xattr_value_len, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, digest);
}
int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len,
- char *digest)
+ char type, char *digest)
{
return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value,
- req_xattr_value_len, IMA_XATTR_DIGEST, digest);
+ req_xattr_value_len, type, digest);
+}
+
+static int evm_is_immutable(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
+{
+ const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL;
+ struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+ if (iint && (iint->flags & EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG))
+ return 1;
+
+ /* Do this the hard way */
+ rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, (char **)&xattr_data, 0,
+ GFP_NOFS);
+ if (rc <= 0) {
+ if (rc == -ENODATA)
+ return 0;
+ return rc;
+ }
+ if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
+ rc = 1;
+ else
+ rc = 0;
+
+ kfree(xattr_data);
+ return rc;
}
+
/*
* Calculate the hmac and update security.evm xattr
*
@@ -255,6 +302,16 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data xattr_data;
int rc = 0;
+ /*
+ * Don't permit any transformation of the EVM xattr if the signature
+ * is of an immutable type
+ */
+ rc = evm_is_immutable(dentry, inode);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
+ if (rc)
+ return -EPERM;
+
rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
xattr_value_len, xattr_data.digest);
if (rc == 0) {
@@ -280,7 +337,7 @@ int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
}
crypto_shash_update(desc, lsm_xattr->value, lsm_xattr->value_len);
- hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, hmac_val);
+ hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, hmac_val);
kfree(desc);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 9826c02e2db8..a8d502827270 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
int evm_initialized;
static char *integrity_status_msg[] = {
- "pass", "fail", "no_label", "no_xattrs", "unknown"
+ "pass", "pass_immutable", "fail", "no_label", "no_xattrs", "unknown"
};
char *evm_hmac = "hmac(sha1)";
char *evm_hash = "sha1";
@@ -76,6 +76,11 @@ static void __init evm_init_config(void)
pr_info("HMAC attrs: 0x%x\n", evm_hmac_attrs);
}
+static bool evm_key_loaded(void)
+{
+ return (bool)(evm_initialized & EVM_KEY_MASK);
+}
+
static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
@@ -123,7 +128,8 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
int rc, xattr_len;
- if (iint && iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS)
+ if (iint && (iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ||
+ iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE))
return iint->evm_status;
/* if status is not PASS, try to check again - against -ENOMEM */
@@ -164,22 +170,26 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
rc = -EINVAL;
break;
case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
+ case EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG:
rc = evm_calc_hash(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
- xattr_value_len, calc.digest);
+ xattr_value_len, xattr_data->type,
+ calc.digest);
if (rc)
break;
rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM,
(const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len,
calc.digest, sizeof(calc.digest));
if (!rc) {
- /* Replace RSA with HMAC if not mounted readonly and
- * not immutable
- */
- if (!IS_RDONLY(d_backing_inode(dentry)) &&
- !IS_IMMUTABLE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))
+ if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) {
+ if (iint)
+ iint->flags |= EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG;
+ evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE;
+ } else if (!IS_RDONLY(d_backing_inode(dentry)) &&
+ !IS_IMMUTABLE(d_backing_inode(dentry))) {
evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name,
xattr_value,
xattr_value_len);
+ }
}
break;
default:
@@ -241,7 +251,7 @@ enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len,
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
{
- if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
+ if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
if (!iint) {
@@ -265,7 +275,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
- if (!evm_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || evm_fixmode)
+ if (!evm_key_loaded() || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || evm_fixmode)
return 0;
return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
}
@@ -280,7 +290,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry)
* affect security.evm. An interesting side affect of writing posix xattr
* acls is their modifying of the i_mode, which is included in security.evm.
* For posix xattr acls only, permit security.evm, even if it currently
- * doesn't exist, to be updated.
+ * doesn't exist, to be updated unless the EVM signature is immutable.
*/
static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
@@ -299,6 +309,7 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
return 0;
goto out;
}
+
evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) {
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
@@ -345,10 +356,17 @@ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
{
const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value;
+ /* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though
+ * there's no HMAC key loaded
+ */
+ if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
+ return 0;
+
if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) {
if (!xattr_value_len)
return -EINVAL;
- if (xattr_data->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)
+ if (xattr_data->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG &&
+ xattr_data->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
return -EPERM;
}
return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
@@ -365,6 +383,12 @@ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
*/
int evm_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
{
+ /* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though
+ * there's no HMAC key loaded
+ */
+ if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
+ return 0;
+
return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
}
@@ -393,8 +417,8 @@ static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode)
void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
{
- if (!evm_initialized || (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)
- && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name)))
+ if (!evm_key_loaded() || (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)
+ && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name)))
return;
evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode);
@@ -414,7 +438,7 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
*/
void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
{
- if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
+ if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
return;
evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode);
@@ -425,12 +449,21 @@ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
/**
* evm_inode_setattr - prevent updating an invalid EVM extended attribute
* @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ *
+ * Permit update of file attributes when files have a valid EVM signature,
+ * except in the case of them having an immutable portable signature.
*/
int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
{
unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
enum integrity_status evm_status;
+ /* Policy permits modification of the protected attrs even though
+ * there's no HMAC key loaded
+ */
+ if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
+ return 0;
+
if (!(ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)))
return 0;
evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
@@ -456,7 +489,7 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
*/
void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
{
- if (!evm_initialized)
+ if (!evm_key_loaded())
return;
if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))
@@ -473,7 +506,7 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data;
int rc;
- if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name))
+ if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name))
return 0;
xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS);
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
index 319cf16d6603..feba03bbedae 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ static ssize_t evm_read_key(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
if (*ppos != 0)
return 0;
- sprintf(temp, "%d", (evm_initialized & ~EVM_SETUP));
+ sprintf(temp, "%d", (evm_initialized & ~EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE));
rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
return rc;
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
{
int i, ret;
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (evm_initialized & EVM_SETUP))
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (evm_initialized & EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE))
return -EPERM;
ret = kstrtoint_from_user(buf, count, 0, &i);
@@ -75,16 +75,30 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (!i || (i & ~EVM_INIT_MASK) != 0)
return -EINVAL;
+ /* Don't allow a request to freshly enable metadata writes if
+ * keys are loaded.
+ */
+ if ((i & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) &&
+ ((evm_initialized & EVM_KEY_MASK) != 0) &&
+ !(evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (i & EVM_INIT_HMAC) {
ret = evm_init_key();
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
/* Forbid further writes after the symmetric key is loaded */
- i |= EVM_SETUP;
+ i |= EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE;
}
evm_initialized |= i;
+ /* Don't allow protected metadata modification if a symmetric key
+ * is loaded
+ */
+ if (evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)
+ evm_initialized &= ~(EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES);
+
return count;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index c84e05866052..fc38ca08dbb5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -153,14 +153,12 @@ static void init_once(void *foo)
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = foo;
memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint));
- iint->version = 0;
- iint->flags = 0UL;
iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
iint->ima_mmap_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
iint->ima_read_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
- iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
+ mutex_init(&iint->mutex);
}
static int __init integrity_iintcache_init(void)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index c7e8db0ea4c0..08fe405338e1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/evm.h>
+#include <linux/iversion.h>
#include "ima.h"
@@ -174,7 +175,7 @@ err_out:
*/
int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr)
{
- int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE;
+ int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH;
flags &= ima_policy_flag;
@@ -215,7 +216,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
* which do not support i_version, support is limited to an initial
* measurement/appraisal/audit.
*/
- i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version;
+ i_version = inode_query_iversion(inode);
hash.hdr.algo = algo;
/* Initialize hash digest to 0's in case of failure */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 65fbcf3c32c7..f2803a40ff82 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -46,14 +46,15 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
/*
* ima_must_appraise - set appraise flag
*
- * Return 1 to appraise
+ * Return 1 to appraise or hash
*/
int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
{
if (!ima_appraise)
return 0;
- return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE, NULL);
+ return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH,
+ NULL);
}
static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -223,13 +224,16 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
if (opened & FILE_CREATED)
iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE;
if ((iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE) &&
- !(iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED))
+ (!(iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) ||
+ (inode->i_size == 0)))
status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
goto out;
}
status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value, rc, iint);
- if ((status != INTEGRITY_PASS) && (status != INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)) {
+ if ((status != INTEGRITY_PASS) &&
+ (status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) &&
+ (status != INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)) {
if ((status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL)
|| (status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
cause = "missing-HMAC";
@@ -248,6 +252,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
break;
}
+ clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
if (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start >=
iint->ima_hash->length)
/* xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous
@@ -266,7 +271,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
break;
case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
- iint->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG;
+ set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA,
(const char *)xattr_value, rc,
iint->ima_hash->digest,
@@ -317,17 +322,20 @@ void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
int rc = 0;
/* do not collect and update hash for digital signatures */
- if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG)
+ if (test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags))
return;
- if (iint->ima_file_status != INTEGRITY_PASS)
+ if ((iint->ima_file_status != INTEGRITY_PASS) &&
+ !(iint->flags & IMA_HASH))
return;
rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, NULL, 0, ima_hash_algo);
if (rc < 0)
return;
+ inode_lock(file_inode(file));
ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint);
+ inode_unlock(file_inode(file));
}
/**
@@ -343,23 +351,21 @@ void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
- int must_appraise;
+ int action;
if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)
|| !(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
return;
- must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, POST_SETATTR);
+ action = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, POST_SETATTR);
+ if (!action)
+ __vfs_removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA);
iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
if (iint) {
- iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_APPRAISED |
- IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK |
- IMA_ACTION_RULE_FLAGS);
- if (must_appraise)
- iint->flags |= IMA_APPRAISE;
+ set_bit(IMA_CHANGE_ATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);
+ if (!action)
+ clear_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);
}
- if (!must_appraise)
- __vfs_removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA);
}
/*
@@ -388,12 +394,12 @@ static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode, int digsig)
iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
if (!iint)
return;
-
- iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
+ set_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);
if (digsig)
- iint->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG;
- return;
+ set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
+ else
+ clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
}
int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 9057b163c378..205bc69361ea 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
if (!ima_used_chip)
return;
- if (tpm_pcr_read(TPM_ANY_NUM, idx, pcr) != 0)
+ if (tpm_pcr_read(NULL, idx, pcr) != 0)
pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 2967d497a665..29b72cd2502e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
int rc;
ima_used_chip = 0;
- rc = tpm_pcr_read(TPM_ANY_NUM, 0, pcr_i);
+ rc = tpm_pcr_read(NULL, 0, pcr_i);
if (rc == 0)
ima_used_chip = 1;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 770654694efc..061425dd6400 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <linux/iversion.h>
#include "ima.h"
@@ -84,10 +85,10 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file,
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
int must_measure,
char **pathbuf,
- const char **pathname)
+ const char **pathname,
+ char *filename)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
- char filename[NAME_MAX];
fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false;
@@ -96,10 +97,13 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file,
if (!iint)
iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
/* IMA_MEASURE is set from reader side */
- if (iint && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE))
+ if (iint && test_bit(IMA_MUST_MEASURE,
+ &iint->atomic_flags))
send_tomtou = true;
}
} else {
+ if (must_measure)
+ set_bit(IMA_MUST_MEASURE, &iint->atomic_flags);
if ((atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0) && must_measure)
send_writers = true;
}
@@ -121,21 +125,25 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
+ bool update;
if (!(mode & FMODE_WRITE))
return;
- inode_lock(inode);
+ mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1) {
- if ((iint->version != inode->i_version) ||
+ update = test_and_clear_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR,
+ &iint->atomic_flags);
+ if (!IS_I_VERSION(inode) ||
+ inode_cmp_iversion(inode, iint->version) ||
(iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) {
iint->flags &= ~(IMA_DONE_MASK | IMA_NEW_FILE);
iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
- if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISE)
+ if (update)
ima_update_xattr(iint, file);
}
}
- inode_unlock(inode);
+ mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
}
/**
@@ -168,7 +176,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
char *pathbuf = NULL;
char filename[NAME_MAX];
const char *pathname = NULL;
- int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise;
+ int rc = 0, action, must_appraise = 0;
int pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL;
int xattr_len = 0;
@@ -199,17 +207,31 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
if (action) {
iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
if (!iint)
- goto out;
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
}
- if (violation_check) {
+ if (!rc && violation_check)
ima_rdwr_violation_check(file, iint, action & IMA_MEASURE,
- &pathbuf, &pathname);
- if (!action) {
- rc = 0;
- goto out_free;
- }
- }
+ &pathbuf, &pathname, filename);
+
+ inode_unlock(inode);
+
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ if (!action)
+ goto out;
+
+ mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
+
+ if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_ATTR, &iint->atomic_flags))
+ /* reset appraisal flags if ima_inode_post_setattr was called */
+ iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_APPRAISED |
+ IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK |
+ IMA_ACTION_FLAGS);
+
+ if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags))
+ /* reset all flags if ima_inode_setxattr was called */
+ iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
/* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask
* (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISED,
@@ -223,11 +245,23 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
if ((action & IMA_MEASURE) && (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr)))
action ^= IMA_MEASURE;
+ /* HASH sets the digital signature and update flags, nothing else */
+ if ((action & IMA_HASH) &&
+ !(test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags))) {
+ xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file), &xattr_value);
+ if ((xattr_value && xattr_len > 2) &&
+ (xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG))
+ set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
+ iint->flags |= IMA_HASHED;
+ action ^= IMA_HASH;
+ set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);
+ }
+
/* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */
if (!action) {
if (must_appraise)
rc = ima_get_cache_status(iint, func);
- goto out_digsig;
+ goto out_locked;
}
template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
@@ -240,7 +274,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo);
if (rc != 0 && rc != -EBADF && rc != -EINVAL)
- goto out_digsig;
+ goto out_locked;
if (!pathbuf) /* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */
pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename);
@@ -248,26 +282,32 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,
xattr_value, xattr_len, pcr);
- if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK))
+ if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) {
+ inode_lock(inode);
rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, pathname,
xattr_value, xattr_len, opened);
+ inode_unlock(inode);
+ }
if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
if ((file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) && (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO))
rc = 0;
-out_digsig:
- if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG) &&
+out_locked:
+ if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags) &&
!(iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE))
rc = -EACCES;
+ mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
kfree(xattr_value);
-out_free:
+out:
if (pathbuf)
__putname(pathbuf);
-out:
- inode_unlock(inode);
- if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
- return -EACCES;
+ if (must_appraise) {
+ if (rc && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
+ return -EACCES;
+ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
+ set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);
+ }
return 0;
}
@@ -366,8 +406,10 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) {
if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) &&
- (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
+ (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
+ pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n");
return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+ }
return 0; /* We rely on module signature checking */
}
return 0;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index ee4613fa5840..915f5572c6ff 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@
#define APPRAISE 0x0004 /* same as IMA_APPRAISE */
#define DONT_APPRAISE 0x0008
#define AUDIT 0x0040
+#define HASH 0x0100
+#define DONT_HASH 0x0200
#define INVALID_PCR(a) (((a) < 0) || \
(a) >= (FIELD_SIZEOF(struct integrity_iint_cache, measured_pcrs) * 8))
@@ -380,8 +382,10 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
action |= entry->flags & IMA_ACTION_FLAGS;
action |= entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK;
- if (entry->action & IMA_APPRAISE)
+ if (entry->action & IMA_APPRAISE) {
action |= get_subaction(entry, func);
+ action ^= IMA_HASH;
+ }
if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action << 1);
@@ -521,7 +525,7 @@ enum {
Opt_err = -1,
Opt_measure = 1, Opt_dont_measure,
Opt_appraise, Opt_dont_appraise,
- Opt_audit,
+ Opt_audit, Opt_hash, Opt_dont_hash,
Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic,
@@ -538,6 +542,8 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
{Opt_appraise, "appraise"},
{Opt_dont_appraise, "dont_appraise"},
{Opt_audit, "audit"},
+ {Opt_hash, "hash"},
+ {Opt_dont_hash, "dont_hash"},
{Opt_obj_user, "obj_user=%s"},
{Opt_obj_role, "obj_role=%s"},
{Opt_obj_type, "obj_type=%s"},
@@ -671,6 +677,22 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
entry->action = AUDIT;
break;
+ case Opt_hash:
+ ima_log_string(ab, "action", "hash");
+
+ if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
+ result = -EINVAL;
+
+ entry->action = HASH;
+ break;
+ case Opt_dont_hash:
+ ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_hash");
+
+ if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
+ result = -EINVAL;
+
+ entry->action = DONT_HASH;
+ break;
case Opt_func:
ima_log_string(ab, "func", args[0].from);
@@ -743,7 +765,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
case Opt_fsuuid:
ima_log_string(ab, "fsuuid", args[0].from);
- if (uuid_is_null(&entry->fsuuid)) {
+ if (!uuid_is_null(&entry->fsuuid)) {
result = -EINVAL;
break;
}
@@ -1040,6 +1062,10 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_appraise));
if (entry->action & AUDIT)
seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_audit));
+ if (entry->action & HASH)
+ seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_hash));
+ if (entry->action & DONT_HASH)
+ seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_hash));
seq_puts(m, " ");
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
index a02a86d51102..418f35e38015 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash, int pcr)
if (!ima_used_chip)
return result;
- result = tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcr, hash);
+ result = tpm_pcr_extend(NULL, pcr, hash);
if (result != 0)
pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n", result);
return result;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index 7412d0291ab9..30db39b23804 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -377,8 +377,7 @@ int ima_restore_measurement_list(loff_t size, void *buf)
break;
if (hdr[HDR_TEMPLATE_NAME].len >= MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN) {
- pr_err("attempting to restore a template name \
- that is too long\n");
+ pr_err("attempting to restore a template name that is too long\n");
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
@@ -389,8 +388,8 @@ int ima_restore_measurement_list(loff_t size, void *buf)
template_name[hdr[HDR_TEMPLATE_NAME].len] = 0;
if (strcmp(template_name, "ima") == 0) {
- pr_err("attempting to restore an unsupported \
- template \"%s\" failed\n", template_name);
+ pr_err("attempting to restore an unsupported template \"%s\" failed\n",
+ template_name);
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
@@ -410,8 +409,8 @@ int ima_restore_measurement_list(loff_t size, void *buf)
&(template_desc->fields),
&(template_desc->num_fields));
if (ret < 0) {
- pr_err("attempting to restore the template fmt \"%s\" \
- failed\n", template_desc->fmt);
+ pr_err("attempting to restore the template fmt \"%s\" failed\n",
+ template_desc->fmt);
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index e1bf040fb110..50a8e3365df7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -25,39 +25,50 @@
#define IMA_COLLECTED 0x00000020
#define IMA_AUDIT 0x00000040
#define IMA_AUDITED 0x00000080
+#define IMA_HASH 0x00000100
+#define IMA_HASHED 0x00000200
/* iint cache flags */
#define IMA_ACTION_FLAGS 0xff000000
#define IMA_ACTION_RULE_FLAGS 0x06000000
-#define IMA_DIGSIG 0x01000000
-#define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED 0x02000000
-#define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO 0x04000000
-#define IMA_NEW_FILE 0x08000000
+#define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED 0x01000000
+#define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO 0x02000000
+#define IMA_NEW_FILE 0x04000000
+#define EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG 0x08000000
#define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \
- IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
+ IMA_HASH | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
#define IMA_DONE_MASK (IMA_MEASURED | IMA_APPRAISED | IMA_AUDITED | \
- IMA_COLLECTED | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK)
+ IMA_HASHED | IMA_COLLECTED | \
+ IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK)
/* iint subaction appraise cache flags */
-#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISE 0x00000100
-#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISED 0x00000200
-#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE 0x00000400
-#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED 0x00000800
-#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE 0x00001000
-#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED 0x00002000
-#define IMA_READ_APPRAISE 0x00004000
-#define IMA_READ_APPRAISED 0x00008000
+#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISE 0x00001000
+#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISED 0x00002000
+#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE 0x00004000
+#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED 0x00008000
+#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE 0x00010000
+#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED 0x00020000
+#define IMA_READ_APPRAISE 0x00040000
+#define IMA_READ_APPRAISED 0x00080000
#define IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISE | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE | \
IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_READ_APPRAISE)
#define IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | \
IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_READ_APPRAISED)
+/* iint cache atomic_flags */
+#define IMA_CHANGE_XATTR 0
+#define IMA_UPDATE_XATTR 1
+#define IMA_CHANGE_ATTR 2
+#define IMA_DIGSIG 3
+#define IMA_MUST_MEASURE 4
+
enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01,
EVM_XATTR_HMAC,
EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG,
IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG,
+ EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG,
IMA_XATTR_LAST
};
@@ -100,10 +111,12 @@ struct signature_v2_hdr {
/* integrity data associated with an inode */
struct integrity_iint_cache {
struct rb_node rb_node; /* rooted in integrity_iint_tree */
+ struct mutex mutex; /* protects: version, flags, digest */
struct inode *inode; /* back pointer to inode in question */
u64 version; /* track inode changes */
unsigned long flags;
unsigned long measured_pcrs;
+ unsigned long atomic_flags;
enum integrity_status ima_file_status:4;
enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status:4;
enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4;
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index d0bccebbd3b5..41bcf57e96f2 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -713,7 +713,6 @@ descend_to_keyring:
* doesn't contain any keyring pointers.
*/
shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
- smp_read_barrier_depends();
if ((shortcut->index_key[0] & ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK) != 0)
goto not_this_keyring;
@@ -723,8 +722,6 @@ descend_to_keyring:
}
node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
- smp_read_barrier_depends();
-
ptr = node->slots[0];
if (!assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr))
goto begin_node;
@@ -736,7 +733,6 @@ descend_to_node:
kdebug("descend");
if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) {
shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
- smp_read_barrier_depends();
ptr = READ_ONCE(shortcut->next_node);
BUG_ON(!assoc_array_ptr_is_node(ptr));
}
@@ -744,7 +740,6 @@ descend_to_node:
begin_node:
kdebug("begin_node");
- smp_read_barrier_depends();
slot = 0;
ascend_to_node:
/* Go through the slots in a node */
@@ -792,14 +787,12 @@ ascend_to_node:
if (ptr && assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) {
shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
- smp_read_barrier_depends();
ptr = READ_ONCE(shortcut->back_pointer);
slot = shortcut->parent_slot;
}
if (!ptr)
goto not_this_keyring;
node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
- smp_read_barrier_depends();
slot++;
/* If we've ascended to the root (zero backpointer), we must have just
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index 98aa89ff7bfd..423776682025 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -355,13 +355,12 @@ out:
* For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our
* own TPM command packets using the drivers send function.
*/
-static int trusted_tpm_send(const u32 chip_num, unsigned char *cmd,
- size_t buflen)
+static int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
{
int rc;
dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
- rc = tpm_send(chip_num, cmd, buflen);
+ rc = tpm_send(NULL, cmd, buflen);
dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
if (rc > 0)
/* Can't return positive return codes values to keyctl */
@@ -382,10 +381,10 @@ static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum)
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
- ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
if (ret != SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
return ret;
- return tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0;
+ return tpm_pcr_extend(NULL, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0;
}
/*
@@ -398,7 +397,7 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,
unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
int ret;
- ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
return ret;
@@ -410,7 +409,7 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,
store32(tb, handle);
storebytes(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
- ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+ ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
@@ -434,7 +433,7 @@ static int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce)
store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
store32(tb, TPM_OIAP_SIZE);
store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OIAP);
- ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+ ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
@@ -493,7 +492,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
- ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
goto out;
ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL);
@@ -542,7 +541,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
store8(tb, cont);
storebytes(tb, td->pubauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
- ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+ ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
@@ -603,7 +602,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL);
keyhndl = htonl(SRKHANDLE);
- ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+ ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) {
pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret);
return ret;
@@ -635,7 +634,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
store8(tb, cont);
storebytes(tb, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
- ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+ ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("trusted_key: authhmac failed (%d)\n", ret);
return ret;
@@ -748,7 +747,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
int i;
int tpm2;
- tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM);
+ tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(NULL);
if (tpm2 < 0)
return tpm2;
@@ -917,7 +916,7 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
struct trusted_key_options *options;
int tpm2;
- tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM);
+ tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(NULL);
if (tpm2 < 0)
return NULL;
@@ -967,7 +966,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
size_t key_len;
int tpm2;
- tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM);
+ tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(NULL);
if (tpm2 < 0)
return tpm2;
@@ -1008,7 +1007,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
switch (key_cmd) {
case Opt_load:
if (tpm2)
- ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload, options);
+ ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(NULL, payload, options);
else
ret = key_unseal(payload, options);
dump_payload(payload);
@@ -1018,13 +1017,13 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
break;
case Opt_new:
key_len = payload->key_len;
- ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload->key, key_len);
+ ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, payload->key, key_len);
if (ret != key_len) {
pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret);
goto out;
}
if (tpm2)
- ret = tpm_seal_trusted(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload, options);
+ ret = tpm_seal_trusted(NULL, payload, options);
else
ret = key_seal(payload, options);
if (ret < 0)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
index 75686d53df07..e77a5e307955 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
@@ -19,8 +19,7 @@
* the GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
- * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
+ * along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
*/
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index aaba6677ee2e..2c297b995b16 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -22,8 +22,7 @@
* the GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
- * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
+ * along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
*/
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 33cfe5d3d6cb..8900ea5cbabf 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -867,6 +867,9 @@ int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
int index;
int rc;
+ if (!ss_initialized)
+ return 0;
+
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
rc = -EINVAL;
@@ -1413,27 +1416,25 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
if (!scontext_len)
return -EINVAL;
+ /* Copy the string to allow changes and ensure a NUL terminator */
+ scontext2 = kmemdup_nul(scontext, scontext_len, gfp_flags);
+ if (!scontext2)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
if (!ss_initialized) {
int i;
for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
- if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext)) {
+ if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext2)) {
*sid = i;
- return 0;
+ goto out;
}
}
*sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
- return 0;
+ goto out;
}
*sid = SECSID_NULL;
- /* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it. */
- scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len + 1, gfp_flags);
- if (!scontext2)
- return -ENOMEM;
- memcpy(scontext2, scontext, scontext_len);
- scontext2[scontext_len] = 0;
-
if (force) {
/* Save another copy for storing in uninterpreted form */
rc = -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 6a71fc7831ab..f7db791fb566 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -321,6 +321,7 @@ struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *, int);
void smk_insert_entry(struct smack_known *skp);
struct smack_known *smk_find_entry(const char *);
bool smack_privileged(int cap);
+bool smack_privileged_cred(int cap, const struct cred *cred);
void smk_destroy_label_list(struct list_head *list);
/*
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 1a3004189447..9a4c0ad46518 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -623,26 +623,24 @@ struct smack_known *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid)
LIST_HEAD(smack_onlycap_list);
DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_onlycap_lock);
-/*
+/**
+ * smack_privileged_cred - are all privilege requirements met by cred
+ * @cap: The requested capability
+ * @cred: the credential to use
+ *
* Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged
* by the onlycap rule.
*
* Returns true if the task is allowed to be privileged, false if it's not.
*/
-bool smack_privileged(int cap)
+bool smack_privileged_cred(int cap, const struct cred *cred)
{
- struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+ struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
+ struct smack_known *skp = tsp->smk_task;
struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
int rc;
- /*
- * All kernel tasks are privileged
- */
- if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD))
- return true;
-
- rc = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, cap,
- SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+ rc = cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
if (rc)
return false;
@@ -662,3 +660,23 @@ bool smack_privileged(int cap)
return false;
}
+
+/**
+ * smack_privileged - are all privilege requirements met
+ * @cap: The requested capability
+ *
+ * Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged
+ * by the onlycap rule.
+ *
+ * Returns true if the task is allowed to be privileged, false if it's not.
+ */
+bool smack_privileged(int cap)
+{
+ /*
+ * All kernel tasks are privileged
+ */
+ if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD))
+ return true;
+
+ return smack_privileged_cred(cap, current_cred());
+}
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 14cc7940b36d..03fdecba93bb 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -2866,12 +2866,16 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
#endif
#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
struct smack_known *rsp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp;
#endif
if (sock->sk == NULL)
return 0;
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
+ ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+#endif
+
switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
case PF_INET:
if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
@@ -4365,6 +4369,10 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
*/
if (tkp == NULL)
return -EACCES;
+
+ if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, cred))
+ return 0;
+
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial;
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/audit.c b/security/tomoyo/audit.c
index 0f73fe30e37a..558e3076d38c 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/audit.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/audit.c
@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ void tomoyo_read_log(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
*
* Returns POLLIN | POLLRDNORM when ready to read an audit log.
*/
-unsigned int tomoyo_poll_log(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
+__poll_t tomoyo_poll_log(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
if (tomoyo_log_count)
return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c
index 25eed4b0b0e8..70c73bf66c88 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c
@@ -2120,7 +2120,7 @@ static struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_domain_by_qid
*
* Waits for access requests which violated policy in enforcing mode.
*/
-static unsigned int tomoyo_poll_query(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
+static __poll_t tomoyo_poll_query(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
if (!list_empty(&tomoyo_query_list))
return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
@@ -2453,7 +2453,7 @@ int tomoyo_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file)
* Returns POLLIN | POLLRDNORM | POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM if ready to read/write,
* POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM otherwise.
*/
-unsigned int tomoyo_poll_control(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
+__poll_t tomoyo_poll_control(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head = file->private_data;
if (head->poll)
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h
index 7adccdd8e36d..539bcdd30bb8 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.h
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h
@@ -789,7 +789,7 @@ struct tomoyo_acl_param {
struct tomoyo_io_buffer {
void (*read) (struct tomoyo_io_buffer *);
int (*write) (struct tomoyo_io_buffer *);
- unsigned int (*poll) (struct file *file, poll_table *wait);
+ __poll_t (*poll) (struct file *file, poll_table *wait);
/* Exclusive lock for this structure. */
struct mutex io_sem;
char __user *read_user_buf;
@@ -981,8 +981,8 @@ int tomoyo_path_number_perm(const u8 operation, const struct path *path,
unsigned long number);
int tomoyo_path_perm(const u8 operation, const struct path *path,
const char *target);
-unsigned int tomoyo_poll_control(struct file *file, poll_table *wait);
-unsigned int tomoyo_poll_log(struct file *file, poll_table *wait);
+__poll_t tomoyo_poll_control(struct file *file, poll_table *wait);
+__poll_t tomoyo_poll_log(struct file *file, poll_table *wait);
int tomoyo_socket_bind_permission(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
int addr_len);
int tomoyo_socket_connect_permission(struct socket *sock,
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c b/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c
index 49393c2a3f8b..fb9bf99deb35 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ static int tomoyo_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
* Returns POLLIN | POLLRDNORM | POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM if ready to read/write,
* POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM otherwise.
*/
-static unsigned int tomoyo_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
+static __poll_t tomoyo_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
return tomoyo_poll_control(file, wait);
}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-12-18 21:20:09 +0000