diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/audit.c | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/auditfilter.c | 61 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/auditsc.c | 9 |
3 files changed, 22 insertions, 55 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 784a48e9f382..a7b16086d36f 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ * * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com> * - * Goals: 1) Integrate fully with SELinux. + * Goals: 1) Integrate fully with Security Modules. * 2) Minimal run-time overhead: * a) Minimal when syscall auditing is disabled (audit_enable=0). * b) Small when syscall auditing is enabled and no audit record @@ -55,7 +55,6 @@ #include <net/netlink.h> #include <linux/skbuff.h> #include <linux/netlink.h> -#include <linux/selinux.h> #include <linux/inotify.h> #include <linux/freezer.h> #include <linux/tty.h> @@ -882,10 +881,6 @@ static int __init audit_init(void) audit_enabled = audit_default; audit_ever_enabled |= !!audit_default; - /* Register the callback with selinux. This callback will be invoked - * when a new policy is loaded. */ - selinux_audit_set_callback(&selinux_audit_rule_update); - audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_KERNEL, "initialized"); #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index 35e58a146eff..7c69cb5e44fb 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/inotify.h> #include <linux/security.h> -#include <linux/selinux.h> #include "audit.h" /* @@ -39,7 +38,7 @@ * Synchronizes writes and blocking reads of audit's filterlist * data. Rcu is used to traverse the filterlist and access * contents of structs audit_entry, audit_watch and opaque - * selinux rules during filtering. If modified, these structures + * LSM rules during filtering. If modified, these structures * must be copied and replace their counterparts in the filterlist. * An audit_parent struct is not accessed during filtering, so may * be written directly provided audit_filter_mutex is held. @@ -141,7 +140,7 @@ static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e) for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) { struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; kfree(f->se_str); - selinux_audit_rule_free(f->se_rule); + security_audit_rule_free(f->se_rule); } kfree(e->rule.fields); kfree(e->rule.filterkey); @@ -598,12 +597,12 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, goto exit_free; entry->rule.buflen += f->val; - err = selinux_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str, - &f->se_rule); + err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str, + (void **)&f->se_rule); /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they * become valid after a policy reload. */ if (err == -EINVAL) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for selinux " + printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM " "\'%s\' is invalid\n", str); err = 0; } @@ -863,9 +862,9 @@ out: return new; } -/* Duplicate selinux field information. The se_rule is opaque, so must be +/* Duplicate LSM field information. The se_rule is opaque, so must be * re-initialized. */ -static inline int audit_dupe_selinux_field(struct audit_field *df, +static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df, struct audit_field *sf) { int ret = 0; @@ -878,12 +877,12 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_selinux_field(struct audit_field *df, df->se_str = se_str; /* our own (refreshed) copy of se_rule */ - ret = selinux_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->se_str, - &df->se_rule); + ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->se_str, + (void **)&df->se_rule); /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they * become valid after a policy reload. */ if (ret == -EINVAL) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for selinux \'%s\' is " + printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is " "invalid\n", df->se_str); ret = 0; } @@ -892,7 +891,7 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_selinux_field(struct audit_field *df, } /* Duplicate an audit rule. This will be a deep copy with the exception - * of the watch - that pointer is carried over. The selinux specific fields + * of the watch - that pointer is carried over. The LSM specific fields * will be updated in the copy. The point is to be able to replace the old * rule with the new rule in the filterlist, then free the old rule. * The rlist element is undefined; list manipulations are handled apart from @@ -945,7 +944,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old, case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: - err = audit_dupe_selinux_field(&new->fields[i], + err = audit_dupe_lsm_field(&new->fields[i], &old->fields[i]); break; case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: @@ -1763,38 +1762,12 @@ unlock_and_return: return result; } -/* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields. Returns 1 if there - are selinux fields specified in the rule, 0 otherwise. */ -static inline int audit_rule_has_selinux(struct audit_krule *rule) -{ - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { - struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i]; - switch (f->type) { - case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: - case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: - case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: - case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: - case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: - case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: - case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: - case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: - case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: - case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: - return 1; - } - } - - return 0; -} - /* This function will re-initialize the se_rule field of all applicable rules. - * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain selinux + * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM * specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the - * selinux field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the + * LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the * updated rule. */ -int selinux_audit_rule_update(void) +int audit_update_lsm_rules(void) { struct audit_entry *entry, *n, *nentry; struct audit_watch *watch; @@ -1806,7 +1779,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_update(void) for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) { list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, n, &audit_filter_list[i], list) { - if (!audit_rule_has_selinux(&entry->rule)) + if (!security_audit_rule_known(&entry->rule)) continue; watch = entry->rule.watch; @@ -1817,7 +1790,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_update(void) * return value */ if (!err) err = PTR_ERR(nentry); - audit_panic("error updating selinux filters"); + audit_panic("error updating LSM filters"); if (watch) list_del(&entry->rule.rlist); list_del_rcu(&entry->list); diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 6a83c706b504..c0700535e5c5 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -61,7 +61,6 @@ #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/list.h> #include <linux/tty.h> -#include <linux/selinux.h> #include <linux/binfmts.h> #include <linux/highmem.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> @@ -533,7 +532,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); need_sid = 0; } - result = selinux_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, + result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx); @@ -549,12 +548,12 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, if (f->se_rule) { /* Find files that match */ if (name) { - result = selinux_audit_rule_match( + result = security_audit_rule_match( name->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx); } else if (ctx) { for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { - if (selinux_audit_rule_match( + if (security_audit_rule_match( ctx->names[j].osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx)) { @@ -570,7 +569,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, aux = aux->next) { if (aux->type == AUDIT_IPC) { struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux; - if (selinux_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx)) { + if (security_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx)) { ++result; break; } |