Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
 "In Linux 4.19, a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data was
  upstreamed, allowing LSMs and IMA to prevent the kexec_load syscall.
  Different signature verification methods exist for verifying the
  kexec'ed kernel image. This adds additional support in IMA to prevent
  loading unsigned kernel images via the kexec_load syscall,
  independently of the IMA policy rules, based on the runtime "secure
  boot" flag. An initial IMA kselftest is included.

  In addition, this pull request defines a new, separate keyring named
  ".platform" for storing the preboot/firmware keys needed for verifying
  the kexec'ed kernel image's signature and includes the associated IMA
  kexec usage of the ".platform" keyring.

  (David Howell's and Josh Boyer's patches for reading the
  preboot/firmware keys, which were previously posted for a different
  use case scenario, are included here)"

* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  integrity: Remove references to module keyring
  ima: Use inode_is_open_for_write
  ima: Support platform keyring for kernel appraisal
  efi: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed
  efi: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
  efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser
  efi: Add EFI signature data types
  integrity: Load certs to the platform keyring
  integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring
  selftests/ima: kexec_load syscall test
  ima: don't measure/appraise files on efivarfs
  x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode
  docs: Extend trusted keys documentation for TPM 2.0
  x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86
  ima: add support for arch specific policies
  ima: refactor ima_init_policy()
  ima: prevent kexec_load syscall based on runtime secureboot flag
  x86/ima: define arch_ima_get_secureboot
  integrity: support new struct public_key_signature encoding field

2 files changed, 49 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index becd5d76a207..45ff763fba76 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -663,6 +663,10 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void);
 #define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID	EFI_GUID(0xd719b2cb, 0x3d3a, 0x4596,  0xa3, 0xbc, 0xda, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x6f)
 #define EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID			EFI_GUID(0x605dab50, 0xe046, 0x4300,  0xab, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xd8, 0x10, 0xdd, 0x8b, 0x23)
 
+#define EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID			EFI_GUID(0xc1c41626, 0x504c, 0x4092, 0xac, 0xa9, 0x41, 0xf9, 0x36, 0x93, 0x43, 0x28)
+#define EFI_CERT_X509_GUID			EFI_GUID(0xa5c059a1, 0x94e4, 0x4aa7, 0x87, 0xb5, 0xab, 0x15, 0x5c, 0x2b, 0xf0, 0x72)
+#define EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID		EFI_GUID(0x3bd2a492, 0x96c0, 0x4079, 0xb4, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xf9, 0x8e, 0xf1, 0x03, 0xed)
+
 /*
  * This GUID is used to pass to the kernel proper the struct screen_info
  * structure that was populated by the stub based on the GOP protocol instance
@@ -934,6 +938,27 @@ typedef struct {
 	efi_memory_desc_t entry[0];
 } efi_memory_attributes_table_t;
 
+typedef struct {
+	efi_guid_t signature_owner;
+	u8 signature_data[];
+} efi_signature_data_t;
+
+typedef struct {
+	efi_guid_t signature_type;
+	u32 signature_list_size;
+	u32 signature_header_size;
+	u32 signature_size;
+	u8 signature_header[];
+	/* efi_signature_data_t signatures[][] */
+} efi_signature_list_t;
+
+typedef u8 efi_sha256_hash_t[32];
+
+typedef struct {
+	efi_sha256_hash_t to_be_signed_hash;
+	efi_time_t time_of_revocation;
+} efi_cert_x509_sha256_t;
+
 /*
  * All runtime access to EFI goes through this structure:
  */
@@ -1113,6 +1138,15 @@ extern int efi_memattr_apply_permissions(struct mm_struct *mm,
 char * __init efi_md_typeattr_format(char *buf, size_t size,
 				     const efi_memory_desc_t *md);
 
+
+typedef void (*efi_element_handler_t)(const char *source,
+				      const void *element_data,
+				      size_t element_size);
+extern int __init parse_efi_signature_list(
+	const char *source,
+	const void *data, size_t size,
+	efi_element_handler_t (*get_handler_for_guid)(const efi_guid_t *));
+
 /**
  * efi_range_is_wc - check the WC bit on an address range
  * @start: starting kvirt address
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 97914a2833d1..b5e16b8c50b7 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -30,6 +30,21 @@ extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry);
 extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image);
 #endif
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86) && defined(CONFIG_EFI)
+extern bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void);
+extern const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void);
+#else
+static inline bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+
+static inline const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
+{
+	return NULL;
+}
+#endif
+
 #else
 static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {