diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2017-11-23 20:51:27 -1000 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2017-11-23 20:51:27 -1000 |
commit | dab0badc8735f4e8bf07bc56bdeefce91d413924 (patch) | |
tree | 1b7f175d6bffe4ee6d93d1828a730daccf1d77d0 /security/keys/key.c | |
parent | 26064dea2dc65c57d44ad37e645ebe47f1c51828 (diff) | |
parent | ce44cd8dfc55110fa7423ceb47a8a70dac65fe89 (diff) |
Merge branch 'next-keys' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull keys update from James Morris:
"There's nothing too controversial here:
- Doc fix for keyctl_read().
- time_t -> time64_t replacement.
- Set the module licence on things to prevent tainting"
* 'next-keys' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
pkcs7: Set the module licence to prevent tainting
security: keys: Replace time_t with time64_t for struct key_preparsed_payload
security: keys: Replace time_t/timespec with time64_t
KEYS: fix in-kernel documentation for keyctl_read()
Diffstat (limited to 'security/keys/key.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/key.c | 27 |
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 17 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c index 83bf4b4afd49..66049183ad89 100644 --- a/security/keys/key.c +++ b/security/keys/key.c @@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, if (authkey) key_revoke(authkey); - if (prep->expiry != TIME_T_MAX) { + if (prep->expiry != TIME64_MAX) { key->expiry = prep->expiry; key_schedule_gc(prep->expiry + key_gc_delay); } @@ -506,7 +506,7 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, prep.data = data; prep.datalen = datalen; prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen; - prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX; + prep.expiry = TIME64_MAX; if (key->type->preparse) { ret = key->type->preparse(&prep); if (ret < 0) @@ -570,7 +570,6 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key, struct key *authkey) { struct assoc_array_edit *edit; - struct timespec now; int ret, awaken, link_ret = 0; key_check(key); @@ -593,8 +592,7 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key, /* mark the key as being negatively instantiated */ atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys); mark_key_instantiated(key, -error); - now = current_kernel_time(); - key->expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout; + key->expiry = ktime_get_real_seconds() + timeout; key_schedule_gc(key->expiry + key_gc_delay); if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags)) @@ -710,16 +708,13 @@ found_kernel_type: void key_set_timeout(struct key *key, unsigned timeout) { - struct timespec now; - time_t expiry = 0; + time64_t expiry = 0; /* make the changes with the locks held to prevent races */ down_write(&key->sem); - if (timeout > 0) { - now = current_kernel_time(); - expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout; - } + if (timeout > 0) + expiry = ktime_get_real_seconds() + timeout; key->expiry = expiry; key_schedule_gc(key->expiry + key_gc_delay); @@ -850,7 +845,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, prep.data = payload; prep.datalen = plen; prep.quotalen = index_key.type->def_datalen; - prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX; + prep.expiry = TIME64_MAX; if (index_key.type->preparse) { ret = index_key.type->preparse(&prep); if (ret < 0) { @@ -994,7 +989,7 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen) prep.data = payload; prep.datalen = plen; prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen; - prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX; + prep.expiry = TIME64_MAX; if (key->type->preparse) { ret = key->type->preparse(&prep); if (ret < 0) @@ -1028,8 +1023,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_update); */ void key_revoke(struct key *key) { - struct timespec now; - time_t time; + time64_t time; key_check(key); @@ -1044,8 +1038,7 @@ void key_revoke(struct key *key) key->type->revoke(key); /* set the death time to no more than the expiry time */ - now = current_kernel_time(); - time = now.tv_sec; + time = ktime_get_real_seconds(); if (key->revoked_at == 0 || key->revoked_at > time) { key->revoked_at = time; key_schedule_gc(key->revoked_at + key_gc_delay); |