From 002c77a48b479b094b834b02ef78be47ceac76fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jarod Wilson Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2014 15:37:30 -0400 Subject: crypto: fips - only panic on bad/missing crypto mod signatures Per further discussion with NIST, the requirements for FIPS state that we only need to panic the system on failed kernel module signature checks for crypto subsystem modules. This moves the fips-mode-only module signature check out of the generic module loading code, into the crypto subsystem, at points where we can catch both algorithm module loads and mode module loads. At the same time, make CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS dependent on CONFIG_MODULE_SIG, as this is entirely necessary for FIPS mode. v2: remove extraneous blank line, perform checks in static inline function, drop no longer necessary fips.h include. CC: "David S. Miller" CC: Rusty Russell CC: Stephan Mueller Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson Acked-by: Neil Horman Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu --- kernel/module.c | 4 ---- 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel/module.c') diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index 81e727cf6df9..ae79ce615cb9 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -60,7 +60,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include "module-internal.h" @@ -2448,9 +2447,6 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info) } /* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */ - if (err < 0 && fips_enabled) - panic("Module verification failed with error %d in FIPS mode\n", - err); if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce) err = 0; -- cgit v1.2.3